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From Guns that Do Not Shoot to 
Foreign Staplers  
HAS THE SUPREME COURT’S MATERIALITY 
STANDARD UNDER ESCOBAR PROVIDED CLARITY 
FOR THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY ABOUT FRAUD 
UNDER THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT? 
Deborah R. Farringer† 
INTRODUCTION 
It all started out simply enough. Members of Congress 
became aware of stories involving rampant fraud against the 
federal government: Brooks Brothers, a government contractor 
that during the Civil War contracted to manufacture 12,000 
uniforms for the Union Army, glued together “shredded, often 
decaying rags, pressed them into a semblance of cloth, and 
sewed the pieces into uniforms,” which promptly disintegrated 
upon being exposed to rain for the first time, all in an effort to 
maximize profit on the contract;1 Army Quartermasters 
purchased the same mules again and again from suppliers; the 
government procured infantry boots for Union soldiers that were 
made of cardboard and would wear out after only a mile’s long 
march.2 Thus, in an effort to curb the “grossest frauds upon the 
Government,”3 the U.S. Congress enacted the False Claims Act  
 † Deborah R. Farringer is an Assistant Professor of Law at Belmont 
University College of Law in Nashville, TN. J.D., Vanderbilt University Law School; 
B.A., University of San Diego. I would like to thank my research assistants Andy 
Goldstein and Kimberly MacDonald for their work and help in bringing this article to 
fruition. Thanks also to Anne Conroy and all of the editorial staff of Brooklyn Law Review 
for their very helpful suggestions and edits to this article. Finally, thank you to my 
husband and children for their never-ending patience and support. 
 1 Ron Soodalter, The Union’s ‘Shoddy’ Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR 
(May 9, 2011, 9:30 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/09/the-unions-
shoddy-aristocracy [http://perma.cc/J9H8-4WME]. 
 2 James B. Helmer, Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years 
for Rogues, Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1264 (2013) (citing 
132 CONG. REC. H6482 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman); CONG. 
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955 (1863)). 
 3 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 956. 
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(FCA).4 Utilizing a legal mechanism originating in England 
known as a qui tam suit,5 the FCA, enacted March 2, 1863, 
permits both private individuals and the federal government 
(through the U.S. district attorneys’ offices) to file an action in 
court on behalf of the United States against a government 
contractor believed to have knowingly submitted false claims to 
the federal government for payment.6 
During the 150-plus years since enactment of the FCA, it 
has become one of the federal government’s most successful 
enforcement mechanisms against government contractors and 
in no industry has it been more impactful than in health care.7 
While it was clear in 1863 that selling the same mule to the 
federal government over and over was fraud, in the complicated 
and highly regulated structure of the U.S. health care system, 
with multiple federal health care programs that provide 
payment and services to individuals in various forms, 
identifying fraud has become increasingly challenging.8 If 
knowingly billing the federal government for a physician visit 
that never actually took place is the submission of a “false claim” 
to the federal government,9 what about billing for a service that, 
 
 4 False Claims Act, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (1863) (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012)). 
 5 Helmer, supra note 2, at 1262 (noting that “the concept of enlisting members 
of the public to protect the King’s property is actually hundreds of years old” and that the 
suits are “called qui tam actions because they are brought by a person qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro si ipso in hac parte sequitur, that is, ‘[w]ho sues on behalf of the king as well 
as for himself.’” (quoting Qui Tam Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990))). 
 6 False Claims Act, 12 Stat. at 696–99. 
 7 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Recovers Over $4.7 
Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2016 (Dec. 14, 2016), https://www.
justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-47-billion-false-claims-act-cases-
fiscal-year-2016 [http://perma.cc/U3Z5-8SC3] [hereinafter Justice Dep’t Recovers Over 
$4.7 Billion] (reporting that, in fiscal year 2016, the health care industry accounted for 
over 53 percent of the total recovery under the FCA); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, Justice Department Recovers From False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2017 (Dec. 
21, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-37-billion-false-
claims-act-cases-fiscal-year-2017 [https://perma.cc/PP7Q-BVQ3] [hereinafter Justice Dep’t 
Recovers Over $3.7 Billion] (reporting that, in fiscal year 2017, the health care industry 
accounted for $2.4 billion of the $3.7 billion total that was collected, which equals just 
over 64 percent). 
 8 Federal health care program is defined as “(1) any plan or program that 
provides health benefits, whether directly, through insurance, or otherwise, which is 
funded directly, in whole or in part, by the United States Government . . .; or (2) any 
State health care program, as defined in Section 1320a-7(h).” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f) 
(2012). The Office of Inspector General has not created an official list of federal health 
care programs that qualify under the definition, so the exact number of federal health 
care programs is not entirely know. See Judith A. Waltz & Adam Hepworth, Medicare 
and Medicaid Administrative Enforcement, 4 HEALTH L. HANDBOOK § 1:4 (2017). 
 9 The Office of Inspector General issued a Special Fraud Alert in 1996 stating 
definitively that billing for services that were never rendered is fraud. Publication of OIG 
Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Services in Nursing Facilities, 
61 Fed. Reg. 30,623 (June 17, 1996). 
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under applicable state licensure law, was required to be provided 
by a licensed psychiatrist but was instead provided by a 
registered nurse?10 If knowingly billing the federal government 
for a service to a complex patient with multiple co-morbidities 
when the service was actually provided to a non-complex patient 
with no co-morbidities is the submission of a “false claim,”11 what 
about billing for a home health service on a date that is prior to 
when a physician actually certifies the need for such home 
health services in a face-to-face visit as required under 
applicable Medicare regulations?12 
For health care entities subject to the FCA, these 
questions are not just an academic exercise, but present real 
issues and problems for purposes of compliance. Not only might 
noncompliance with regulations present potential FCA liability 
as a result of a qui tam relator claim, but retention of known 
overpayments is also actionable as a false claim.13 Thus, entities 
subject to the FCA need to know and understand when and in 
what circumstances noncompliance with regulations constitutes 
a false or fraudulent claim in order to not only correct the 
problem, but also remit known overpayments.14 Clear guidance 
and direction regarding what does or does not constitute fraud 
under the FCA is paramount. 
While the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and qui tam 
relators’15 counsel have been arguing for over twenty years that 
 
 10 See Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 1997 (2016) (involving a claim that certain false representations, such as a nurse 
prescribing medication as a psychiatrist without appropriate licensing, violate the False 
Claims Act). 
 11 See, e.g., United States v. Larm, 824 F.2d 780, 782 (9th Cir. 1987) (involving 
a case in which the physician and his wife billed for an examination or evaluation related 
to a new treatment or illness for routine allergy shots that were administered only by 
the physician’s nurse). This sort of scheme is often referred to as upcoding, or “DRG 
creep,” in the hospital context, in which the hospital bills for a service at a higher 
reimbursement rate than is necessary for the patient. See DAVID E. MATYAS ET AL., 
LEGAL ISSUES IN HEALTHCARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: NAVIGATING THE UNCERTAINTIES 267–
68 (4th ed. 2012). 
 12 See United States ex rel. Prather v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., Inc., 
838 F.3d 750, 758–59 (6th Cir. 2016) (involving a case in which home health service was 
provided before the required physician certification of the service). 
 13 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). 
 14 Id. 
 15 A qui tam relator is the name given to those individuals who file a lawsuit 
under the FCA on behalf of the federal government. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1). These 
individuals are also often referred to as whistleblowers. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 
692 (2d. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989; see also Thomas R. Lee, The 
Standing of Qui Tam Relators Under the False Claims Act, 57 U. CHI. L. REV 543, 543 
(1990) (“The qui tam provision of the Act authorizes private individuals to adopt the 
government’s cause of action and sue on behalf of the United States. These qui tam 
plaintiffs, or ‘relators,’ receive a ‘bounty’ of up to thirty percent of the damage award or 
settlement, plus expenses, attorney fees, and costs of suit.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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all of the above-referenced instances are false claims,16 the 
various federal circuit courts have not shared widespread 
agreement on whether all such examples necessarily constitute 
“fraud” under the FCA in all instances.17 The distinction between 
these examples lies in whether the alleged fraud is based on 
misleading or fraudulent facts submitted on the claim form 
regarding the services provided or based on misleading or 
fraudulent certification on the claim form implying that the 
claimant provided such services in compliance with all applicable 
underlying laws, rules, and regulations.18 Courts have referred to 
the latter example as an “implied false certification.”19 While most 
courts were in agreement that FCA liability did extend to cover 
at least some forms of implied false certification claims, there 
was a lack of consensus about how far to extend such liability in 
these sorts of claims.20 Then, in the case of Universal Health 
Services, Inc. v. U.S. ex rel. Escobar,21 the Supreme Court sought 
to clarify (a) whether the FCA could be used by both qui tam 
relators and the government to sustain a claim that a 
contractor’s failure to comply with certain underlying regulatory 
 
 16 Although not so named, the so-called “implied false certification” theory of 
liability, which will be explained in more detail in Part II of this article, seemed to first 
be recognized in the cases of Ab-Tech Const., Inc. v. United States. Ab-Tech Const., Inc. 
v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (1994), aff ’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating 
that the use of payment vouchers as implied certifications resulted in fraudulent claims); 
see also Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699 (“The implied certification theory was applied in Ab-Tech 
Construction, Inc. . . . .”). 
 17 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 
F.3d 377, 385–88 (1st Cir. 2011); United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 
1257, 1268–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697 (joining the position of only four 
circuit courts regarding what is required for a claim to be false under the FCA). 
 18 Some circuit courts have described this distinction as a claim being either 
“factually false” or “legally false”; that is, is the falsity based on facts regarding the 
service itself or is the falsity because the claimant fails to comply with a legal 
requirement (even if the service itself was provided and information on the claim form 
regarding the actual service is true and correct.). See, e.g., Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697. 
 19 Id. at 699. The name “implied false certification” was first utilized by a 
district court in the case of United States ex rel. Mikes v. Straus, although the general 
concept had been recognized by other courts prior to this case. See United States ex rel. 
Mikes v. Straus, 84 F. Supp. 2d 427, 434–37 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that while the 
Second Circuit had not yet considered this theory of fraud, it had been considered and 
utilized by the Federal Court of Claims in Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., and while rejected for 
certain cases based on the facts of such case, recognized as being utilized “only in those 
exceptional circumstances where the claimant’s adherence to the relevant statutory or 
regulatory mandates lies at the core of its agreement with the Government, or, in more 
practical terms, where the Government would have refused to pay had it been aware of 
the claimant’s non-compliance.”). Note that courts have also recognized a theory known 
as “express false certification,” which is the name utilized when compliance with a 
particular law, rule, or regulation is expressly a condition to submission of the claim form 
itself. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697–98. 
 20 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 21 See generally Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 
136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
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requirements constitutes a false claim by virtue of the implied 
certification that the contractor makes in order to receive 
payment; and, if yes, (b) whether such underlying regulation is 
required to be a precondition to payment (i.e., the government 
will not pay the claim unless the claimant complies with such 
regulation).22 
The Court quieted at least part of the existing debate, finding 
that the implied false certification theory can be utilized as a basis 
for liability under the FCA in certain instances.23 It perhaps fueled 
a greater debate, however, in rejecting the strict limitation regarding 
such underlying law, rule, or regulation being a precondition to 
payment and holding instead that any liability requires a showing 
that the claimant’s “misrepresentation about compliance with a 
statutory, regulatory, or contractual requirement . . . be material to 
the Government’s payment decision.”24 
Abandoning the need for a detailed analysis into the 
basis and intention behind myriad regulations,25 the unanimous 
Court indicated a need to return to legal fundamentals, 
providing guidance based on common law principles for 
establishment of materiality.26 Seemingly, the Court’s guidance 
 
 22 Id. at 1995–96. 
 23 Id. at 1999. 
 24 Id. at 1996 (emphasis added). With this holding, the Court abrogated Mikes, 
which held that the “implied false certification is appropriately applied only when the 
underlying statute or regulation upon which the plaintiff relies expressly states the 
provider must comply in order to be paid.” Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700 (emphasis in original). 
Recognition of the idea that liability could exist under the FCA was adopted by nearly 
all circuits. See United States ex rel. Quinn v. Omnicare, Inc., 382 F.3d 432, 441 (3d Cir. 
2004). Only some courts, however, have also recognized that such claims would be 
limited to those regulations that are a condition to payment. See Chesbrough v. VPA, 
P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 467–68 (6th Cir. 2011) (acknowledging that the theory of implied 
false certification was adopted by United States ex rel. Augustine v. Century Health 
Servs., Inc., 289 F.3d 409, 415 (6th Cir. 2002), but failing to find liability under the 
implied false certification theory because the plaintiffs failed to allege that the Medicare 
regulation in question did not “require compliance with an industry standard as a 
prerequisite to payment.”); United States ex rel. Hendow v. Univ. of Phoenix, 461 F.3d 
1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the theory of implied false certification was 
recognized by United States ex rel. Hopper v. Anton, 91 F.3d 1261, 1266 (9th Cir. 1996)); 
Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1999); United 
States ex rel. Thompson v. Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 125 F.3d 899, 902 (5th Cir. 
1997); Ab-Tech Constr., Inc., 31 Fed. Cl. at 434. But see United States ex rel. Hutcheson 
v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 385–88 (1st Cir. 2011) (finding that a 
regulation be a precondition of payment is not found in the text of the FCA); United 
States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1268–69 (D.C. Cir. 2010); United 
States ex rel. Conner v. Salina Regional Health Center, Inc., 543 F.3d 1211, 1218 (10th 
Cir. 2008). 
 25 The usual analysis for determining whether a regulation was a condition of 
participation or a condition of payment often involved detailed analysis about where in 
the statute such regulation was located. See United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United 
Health Group, Inc., 659 F.3d 295, 309 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 26 See Joan H. Krause, Reflection on Certification, Interpretation, and the Quest for 
Fraud that “Counts” Under the False Claims Act, 5 UNIV. OF ILL. L. REV. 1811, 1813 (2017). 
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was intended to assist contractors in understanding what might 
matter for purposes of compliance with a vast number of federal 
and state laws and regulations to which government contractors 
are subject, especially federal health care program participants.27 
So, as federal district courts and courts of appeals attempt to 
apply the Court’s dictates in Escobar, it is necessary to ask 
whether the Court succeeded in easing the complexity of this 
aspect of the FCA. Have lower courts been able to consistently 
apply the new standards to assess materiality? Or, has the 
opinion, which arguably both broadened and narrowed 
application of the implied false certificate theory and when 
liability might attach,28 further muddied the waters for courts 
and parties attempting to determine whether behavior is of the 
sort that qualifies as “fraud”? Most importantly, what impact 
has the Escobar opinion had on providers and other government 
contractors for purposes of trying to determine whether 
noncompliance with a regulation of any sort constitutes fraud for 
purposes of the FCA? 
In reviewing lower court opinions analyzing FCA claims 
in accordance with the dictates of Escobar, this article argues 
that while Escobar does seem to be motivating lower courts to 
apply a rigorous and demanding materiality standard, the 
Court’s “back-to-basics” approach in determining materiality 
seems to be providing little consistency regarding what type of 
evidence would need to be proffered to satisfy the new 
materiality standard. To the extent such lack of consistency 
endures, providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and other parties 
potentially subject to application of the FCA in the health care 
setting will continue to struggle to determine how to consider 
Escobar for purposes of assessing and prioritizing compliance risk. 
Part I of this article briefly examines the history of the 
FCA and explores how the FCA has evolved as the primary 
enforcement tool for health care fraud and abuse. This Part 
 
 27 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. The Court adopted a two-part test for what sorts 
of claims might qualify as viable implied false certification claims under the FCA. Id. 
The details of the two-part test and how lower courts are interpreting such test is 
addressed in Part II, infra. 
 28 As will be explored more fully in Part II, infra, the opinion seems to broaden 
application of the implied false certification theory on the basis that it potentially opened 
up the possibility of types of implied false certification claims that would have been 
rejected under a stricter application requiring that only such regulations that are 
conditions of payment, and not conditions of participation, would qualify for purposes of 
implied false certification liability. See Mikes, 274 F.3d at 700. The Court then narrowed 
application of this theory, however, when it stated definitively that such claims must be 
limited by materiality and such materiality standards should be demanding, so as to 
avoid application of the FCA as “an all-purpose antifraud statute.” See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). 
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further examines the origins of the implied false certification 
theory and the various splits and issues among the circuit courts 
that prompted the Supreme Court to review this issue in 
Escobar. In Part II, this article examines the details of the 
Escobar case and outlines the specific findings of the Supreme 
Court as well as how the DOJ, federal district courts, and federal 
courts of appeals have interpreted the Escobar opinion. Then, 
Part II analyzes the approaches of various courts in applying the 
new materiality standard to examine the impact the standard 
will have on future FCA cases relying on the implied false 
certification theory. It further highlights consistent themes, 
open questions, or distinctions that have emerged since the 
issuance of the Escobar opinion. Next, Part III argues that while 
Escobar may succeed in ensuring a more exacting and 
demanding standard for claims relying on an implied false 
certification theory, and thus a broader number of defenses 
available to defendants involved in FCA cases, the lack of 
consistency for specific types of proof that constitute materiality 
will have a detrimental effect on ongoing compliance efforts by 
those entities subject to the FCA. These challenges will be 
particularly acute for health care entities, including providers 
and suppliers, in trying to prioritize and assess risk and in 
operation of effective compliance programs under the countless 
regulations to which such entities are subject. Finally, this 
article concludes by offering some suggestions for potentially 
mitigating or lessening some of the confusion that might arise 
through the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) 
and other state regulatory agencies by issuing clear and precise 
communication about what types of fraud those agencies believe 
should be actionable under the FCA. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. History of the False Claims Act 
Although use and application of the FCA has gone 
through various changes since its 1863 enactment, the goals of 
the FCA today are not too dissimilar to this description of the 
purpose of the law declared in 1943: 
[The False Claims Act] is intended to protect the treasury against the 
hungry and unscrupulous host that encompasses it on every side, and 
should be construed accordingly. It was passed upon the 
theory . . . that one of the least expensive and most effective means of 
preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of them 
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liable to actions by private persons acting . . . under the strong 
stimulus of personal ill will or the hope of gain.29 
The concept of incentivizing private individuals to report 
suspected fraud may be somewhat novel under the bulk of 
today’s laws, but this legal mechanism was actually quite 
common in the early history of the United States.30 Adopted from 
English tradition, laws that not only relied on, but also 
encouraged and incentivized private individuals to seek recovery 
and reward on behalf of the federal government were rather 
typical and found to be a relatively effective means of 
prosecuting crimes.31 When enacting what was sometimes 
referred to as the “Informer’s Act” or “Lincoln’s Law,”32 Congress 
recognized that a monetary reward (then 50 percent of the 
recovery amount) would be strong incentive for an individual to 
“betray[ ]  his co-conspirator.”33 By the mid-1940s, the federal 
government had established the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
and the need for private citizens to alert the government to bad 
actors as a means for prosecution began to lessen due to the new 
role of a federal prosecutor.34 
As a result of the new agency and the thought that the 
DOJ should be able to appropriately prosecute fraud against the 
government, many began to become concerned that the FCA was 
actually feeding “parasitic” lawsuits.35 Thus, a 1943 amendment 
greatly cut back on the incentives, and consequently the use of 
the FCA by qui tam relators.36 For the next forty-plus years, use 
 
 29 United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 366 (D. Or. 1885); see also Hughes 
Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (citing United 
States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 n.5 (1943)). 
 30 See Helmer, supra note 2, at 1263 (noting that ten to twelve of the first fourteen 
laws to be enacted under the first Continental Congress of the United States authorized qui 
tam suits). 
 31 Id. at 1263–64. 
 32 See United States ex rel. Graber v. City of New York, 8 F. Supp. 2d 343, 352 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 33 Helmer, supra note 2, at 1265–66 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th CONG., 3D 
SESS. 955 (1863) (statement of Sen. Howard)). 
 34 Id. at 1267 (“As a result of WWII, a whole new class of war profiteers 
surfaced. But unlike 1863, by 1943 the federal government had a Department of Justice, 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation, which pursued criminal prosecutions 
against some government contractors.”). 
 35 In re United States ex rel. S. Prawer and Co. v. Fleet Bank of Maine, 24 F.3d 
320, 324 (1st Cir. 1994) (“During the New Deal and World War II, there was a notable 
increase in the number of contracts awarded by the government to private individuals 
and entities. Along with this increase came a concomitant surge in the number of qui 
tam actions brought by relators under the FCA. This litigational surge, in turn, brought 
to the fore the fact that the qui tam provisions then in effect were too susceptible to abuse 
by ‘parasitic’ relators.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 36 Id. at 325 (noting that the amendment essentially prohibited any claim by a 
relator that was “based on evidence or information the Government had when the action 
was brought” (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4) (1982))). 
2018] GUNS THAT DO NOT SHOOT & FOREIGN STAPLERS 1235 
of the FCA as a mechanism for identifying and prosecuting fraud 
was extremely limited.37 In fact, it was so limited that, due to 
Congress’s concern that widespread fraud was draining the 
public fisc, it amended the FCA in 1986 to strike a better balance 
between incentivizing relators to report fraud and also 
preventing parasitic lawsuits.38 
Although the FCA has been amended on a few occasions 
since 1986, it was this more extensive amendment in 1986 that 
gave rise to the modern day application of the FCA.39 Indeed, 
with an average annual recovery of almost $4 billion in federal 
money since 2009,40 there is little question that in recent years 
the FCA has become an extremely powerful tool for the federal 
 
 37 Id. 
 38 False Claims Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat. 3153 
(codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et seq. (2012)). These changes were 
accomplished primarily by adding an original source provision as an exception to the 
prohibition against government knowledge and enacting other provisions that attempted 
to achieve the “twin goals of rejecting suits which the government is capable of pursuing 
itself, while promoting those which the government is not equipped to bring on its own.” 
United States ex rel. Springfield Terminal Railway Co., v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 651 (D.C. 
Cir. 1994); see also James B. Helmer, Jr. & Robert Clark Neff, Jr., War Stories: A History 
of the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, The 1986 Amendments to the False 
Claims Act, and their Application in the United States ex rel. Gravitt v. General Electric 
Co. Litigation, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 35, 44 (1991). Helmer and Neff note that the changes 
to the FCA included loosening the knowledge requirement, increasing penalties for 
violations of the FCA, permitting the qui tam relator to pursue the claim even if the 
federal government chose not to intervene, increasing the relator’s share of the proceeds 
from no greater than 10 percent to 25 percent and an even greater recovery for relators 
proceeding on his/her own, and altering the bar against claims in which the government 
had prior knowledge (often referred to as the public disclosure bar) to permit these claims 
to the extent that the relator could claim to be an “original source,” as defined in the 
statute. Id. at 45–50. 
 39 See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Celebrates 25th 
Anniversary of False Claims Act Amendments of 1986 (Jan. 31, 2012), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-celebrates-25th-anniversary-false-claims-act-
amendments-1986 [http://perma.cc/BM8A-CX7N] (“The False Claims Act has been called 
the single most important tool that American taxpayers have to recover funds when false 
claims are made to the federal government, including health care fraud, mortgage fraud, 
and procurement fraud. ‘In the last quarter century, the False Claim Act’s success has been 
unparalleled with more than $30 billion dollars recovered since it was amended in 1986 
and $8.8 billion since January 2009,’ said Attorney General Eric Holder.”). 
 40 Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 et 
seq. can be used to recover money improperly paid to or retained by entities or person 
who contract with the federal government. There are certain programs, such as state 
Medicaid programs, that involve a mix of federal and state funding and therefore many 
False Claims Act cases include allegations regarding not just fraud against the federal 
government, but also against state programs that include both state and federal funding. 
Thus, utilizing similar state false claims statutes, there are often portions of a recovery 
that inure back to states. Robin Rudowitz, Medicaid Financing: The Basics, KAISER 
FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 22, 2016), https://www.kff.org/report-section/medicaid-financing-
the-basics-issue-brief/ [https://perma.cc/DTE2-8EBC] (describing the Medicaid program 
as a program in which the “federal government matches state spending for eligible 
beneficiaries and qualifying services”); see also Medicaid Fraud Control Units—MFCUs, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/medicaid-fraud-control-
units-mfcu/index.asp [https://perma.cc/WDS4-W59F]. 
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government to identify fraud and recover money that has been 
improperly paid to, or retained by, government contractors.41 
The DOJ has reported that 60 percent of its FCA recoveries since 
1986 have come in the last eight years42 and the total recovery 
since 1986 is over $36 billion.43 
B. Health Care and the False Claims Act 
Much of the $36 billion recovery has arisen out of claims 
from the health care industry, which includes providers (e.g., 
hospitals, physicians, nursing homes, etc.), pharmaceutical 
companies, medical device manufacturers, and suppliers (e.g., 
laboratories, durable medical equipment companies, ambulance 
services, etc.).44 Any entity or individual participating in a 
federal health care program, including Medicare and Medicaid, 
or any entity or individual supplying items, goods, or services 
that are reimbursable by a federal health care program—even if 
such entity or individual does not, by itself, contract with the 
federal government—is potentially liable under the FCA.45 
Given the breadth of the FCA’s language and the structure of 
the U.S. health care system, it is not surprising that the FCA 
has become the primary enforcement mechanism for confronting 
health care fraud for the federal government46 and has become 
equally big business for relators.47 With over fifty-eight million 
 
 41 Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7. 
 42 Id.; Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7. 
 43 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DIV., FRAUD STATISTICS—HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES 2017 [hereinafter FRAUD STATISTICS], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/1020116/download [https://perma.cc/G5K4-CBJH] (citing statistics between 
October 1, 1986 through September 30, 2017). 
 44 See, e.g., Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7 (stating that 
in 2016, of the $4.7 billion recovered of federal dollars, almost $2.5 billion was monies 
recovered from the health care industry); Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra 
note 7 (stating that in 2017, of the $3.7 billion recovered of federal dollars, almost $2.4 
billion was monies recovered from the health care industry). 
 45 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (applies to “any person who (A) knowingly presents, or 
causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval; (B) knowingly 
makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false 
or fraudulent claim; . . . (G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false 
record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an 
obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government”). 
 46 Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $4.7 Billion, supra note 7. 
 47 Id. (noting that of the 702 qui tam cases that were filed, 501 of them (71 
percent) were health care related and recovery from health care qui tam relators 
accounted for 93 percent of the total health care recovery of almost $2.5 billion total 
recovery amount). It should be noted that although the percentage of FCA cases that are 
filed by a qui tam relator are high, the recovery amount for cases in which the federal 
government declines to intervene remain low. In 2016, the percentage of recovery that 
was attributed to non-intervened cases was 2 percent. This percentage is consistent with 
the average percentage of recovery in years’ past, with the exception of 2015 in which 
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Medicare beneficiaries and over seventy-two million Medicaid 
beneficiaries in the United States,48 there are few hospitals, 
physicians, or other providers or suppliers that do not 
participate in federal health care programs.49 Thus, application 
of the FCA extends nearly universal reach over all players in the 
health care industry. 
In addition to the ability to apply FCA provisions to 
nearly all sectors of the health care industry, the potential 
damages and liability that could be imposed under the FCA is a 
further factor that has made the FCA such a powerful and 
effective enforcement tool. Violations of the FCA include (1) an 
obligation to remit to the federal government any payments 
made by the government pursuant to a claim that is considered 
to be false, (2) the ability for the federal government to seek 
treble damages on the total amount of the payments to be 
remitted to the government, and (3) the ability for the federal 
government to impose fines ranging from $10,781.40 to 
$21,562.80 per claim submitted.50 Additionally, to the extent 
 
relators in cases in which the federal government declined to intervene accounted for 32 
percent of the total recovery. FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43. While it is difficult to tell 
for sure, it seems likely that 2015 was an outlier as opposed to a new trend. 
 48 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., CMS FAST FACTS (2018), 
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/CMS-Fast-Facts/index.html [https://perma.cc/BSU5-ZUTX]. 
 49 Id. at 8–9. According to Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
in calendar year 2016, there were 6,146 total hospitals participating in Medicare, along 
with 11,956 home health agencies, 15,274 skilled nursing facilities, 254,133 labs, 2,080 
outpatient physical therapy/speech pathology facilities, 4,153 rural health clinics, 7,723 
federally qualified health centers, 5,529 ambulatory surgical centers, 193 comprehensive 
outpatient rehabilitation facilities, and 4,473 hospices. Also, there are 1,249,691 total 
non-institutional providers (e.g., physicians and nurse practitioners) participating in the 
Medicare program. It is difficult to glean what such participation is as a percentage 
relative to total hospitals, as available data does not necessarily track the same data 
points. For example, the American Hospital Association (AHA) in 2018 states that there 
is a total of 5,534 “registered” hospitals in the U.S. AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FAST FACTS ON U.S. 
HOSPITALS (2018), https://www.aha.org/system/files/2018-02/2018-aha-hospital-fast-
facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/8N78-HVZ2]. “Registered hospitals are those hospitals that 
meet the AHA’s criteria for registration” that may or may not also be members of the 
AHA. Id. Individual provider statistics are also challenging, but based on census data 
there were approximately 916,264 actively licensed physicians in the U.S. See Aaron 
Young et al., A Census of Actively Licensed Physicians in the United States, 2014, 101 J. 
MED. REG. 8, 11 (2015). 
 50 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1); False Claims Act Penalties, FINDLAW (2018), 
http://employment.findlaw.com/whistleblowers/false-claims-act-penalties.html [https://
perma.cc/EC2L-AUBT] (“Under the text of the FCA, those who submit fraudulent claims 
to the government are subject to a civil penalty of between $5,000 and $10,000 for each 
claim. However, because the Act allows for inflationary adjustments, as of 2016, violators 
now face penalties of between $10,781.40 and $21,562.80 per claim.”). The civil penalty 
assessed per claim was increased as of February 3, 2017 to the limits referenced above. 
Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment for 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 9131, 9133 (Feb. 3, 
2017) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(9)). Note that with respect to what amounts 
are necessary to be remitted, courts have taken different approaches regarding what 
might constitute the amount of the overpayment. Some prosecutors have sought, and 
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that an FCA claim is based on an underlying violation of the 
Antikickback Statute51 or knowing violation of the Physician 
Self-Referral Statute (otherwise known as the Stark Law),52 not 
only would the penalties under the FCA apply, but penalties for 
violations of the Antikickback Statute and Stark Law would also 
apply, adding additional penalties of $21,916 per claim for each 
violation of the Antikickback Statute53 and penalties ranging 
from a maximum of $24,253 per claim or $161,692 for a 
fraudulent scheme under the Stark Law.54 
Given the potential penalties and damages associated 
with the FCA, not to mention reimbursement of funds (often for 
services that were in fact rendered), liability under the FCA is 
an incredibly high-stakes game for those in the health care 
industry. It also means the possibility of a very lucrative 
monetary “reward,” or windfall, to a potential whistleblower who 
might be willing to bring the claim.55 It is this combination of 
factors that has made the FCA such an effective tool for the 
federal government and such a source of stress and 
consternation for providers, suppliers, manufacturers, and 
 
courts have awarded, any and all monies paid to a provider pursuant to any claim that 
is considered fraudulent. Other courts have sought only the difference between the 
amount that was paid in excess of the amount that would have been paid if the service 
had been billed properly (e.g., the difference between the reimbursement paid for the 
appropriate DRG level vs. the amount paid for the highest DRG level). See United States 
v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1017 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that the judgment against the 
plaintiff did not exceed the Excessive Fines Clause because the government could have 
sought damages for 8,499 claims “[s]ince the use of [fraudulent use of Mackby’s father’s 
UPIN] led to liability, all 8,499 claims constitute violations of the FCA” but the 
government chose to only seek damages for the claims that were submitted that exceeded 
a billing cap). 
 51 The federal Antikickback Statute imposes penalties for “knowingly and 
willfully [offering or paying] any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in kind” in return for referring “an 
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item or 
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under a Federal health care 
program . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2012). 
 52 The Stark Law prohibits a physician (or the physician’s immediate family 
member, as defined in the statute) from making referrals for certain services known as 
“designated health services” to any entity with which the physician has a “financial 
relationship.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1). 
 53 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13) (2017). The penalties were increased on February 3, 
2017. Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment for 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. at 9133 (Feb. 
3, 2017) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 85.3(a)(13)). 
 54 Annual Civil Monetary Penalties Inflation Adjustment, 82 Fed. Reg. 9174, 
9179–80 (Feb. 3, 2017) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 1003.310). 
 55 While the percentage of the qui tam relator’s “award” has varied since 1863, 
current recovery amounts under Section 3730(d)(1) are “at least 15 percent but not more 
than 25 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement of the claim” for suits in which 
the federal government intervenes and under Section 3730(d)(2) are “not less than 25 
percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” 31 
U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)–(2). 
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others potentially liable under this statute.56 Facing penalties 
and damages sometimes upward of hundreds of millions of 
dollars, these devastating outcomes have pushed a majority of 
defendants to settle their claims.57 Even if the claims may be 
explainable or defensible or when the relators might have only 
part of the facts, when faced with the possibility of an FCA suit 
many entities will settle such claims with the federal 
government in lieu of taking their chances with the court 
system.58 In fact, of the “Significant False Claims Act 
Settlements & Judgment” reported by the federal government 
for years 2009–2016, only one of the forty reported cases were 
judgments as opposed to settlements.59 
This is not to say that the mere filing of an FCA claim 
equals success on the merits or that a defendant is unable to ever 
successfully defeat an FCA claim. On the contrary, the vast 
majority of amounts recovered in FCA cases result from cases in 
which the U.S. government has intervened, amounting to only 
about 25 percent of all qui tam cases.60 While there has been an 
upward trend in success of qui tam relators who proceed on their 
own (i.e., achieve settlement or a favorable judgment after the 
DOJ has declined to intervene), defendants are ultimately 
successful in defeating most qui tam claims that qui tam relators 
 
 56 Ryan Winkler, Note, The Civil False Claims Act and its Unreasonably Broad 
Scope of Liability: The Need for Real “Clarifications” Following the Fraud Enforcement 
and Recovery Act of 2009, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 533, 551–52 (2012). 
 57 It is difficult to glean from existing public data sources the sheer number of 
settlements versus judgments under the FCA, as the data that is reported is reported as 
amounts recovered from both settlements and judgments. Reading between the lines a 
little on some of the information reported, it seems the vast majority of major cases are 
settled and thus a majority of the monetary recovery amounts are settlements as opposed 
to successful judgments in court. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: 
SIGNIFICANT FALSE CLAIMS ACT SETTLEMENTS & JUDGEMENTS FISCAL YEARS 2009–2016 
(2016) [hereinafter FACT SHEET], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/918366/
download [http://perma.cc/HKY8-D2RX] (citing to a total of forty major recoveries in 
seven years and $19.3 billion in recovery amounts and noting that only one of the forty 
cases involved a judgment versus a settlement agreement). 
 58 See id. 
 59 Id. It should be noted that of those cases that were considered “Health Care 
Fraud” all reported cases involved settlements. The one case that resulted from a 
judgment was part of the “Other Fraud Recoveries” category and involved a global 
financial institution that was found to have violated the Department of Agriculture’s 
Supplier Credit Guarantee Program. Id. at 10–11. 
 60 Eric Topor, Intervention in False Claims Act Lawsuits: Is It Make or Break?, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 24, 2017), https://www.bna.com/intervention-false-claims-
n73014460786/ [https://perma.cc/4W4B-F6DA]. Note that there are also a portion of FCA 
claims that are filed directly by the DOJ in its capacity. For example, in the year 2016, 
approximately 4 percent of the total amount recovered under the FCA resulted from non-
qui tam cases. Id.; see also Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7 (noting 
that $3.4 billion of the $3.7 billion in total recovery was due to qui tam lawsuits and a 
total of 669 qui tam lawsuits filed). 
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pursue in their own capacity.61 Thus, while the threat of the 
government intervening in the claim often encourages settlement, 
the ability to avoid a government intervention may actually 
result in greater ability of the defendant to succeed in defeating 
the claim. The threat of the potential penalties and likelihood of 
success after the government has intervened, however, is so 
great that despite some success in non-intervened cases,62 entities 
are nevertheless motivated to settle any alleged claims. 
1. The Rise of Implied False Certification Cases 
As use of the FCA increased following the 1986 
amendments, so too did the sophistication and expansion of the 
types of claims that might be actionable under the FCA. In 
reviewing FCA jurisprudence between 1986 and 1994, most 
claims alleged fraud through factual misrepresentations 
regarding the services themselves, such as physicians billing for 
services that were never rendered,63 clinics billing for services 
that were not medically necessary,64 or providers billing for 
higher levels of care than were actually provided.65 In addition 
to allegations of these “factually false” claims,66 prosecutors and 
relators began alleging fraud arising out of misrepresentations 
 
 61 Topor, supra note 60 (noting that 23 percent of the total recovery of $1.9 
billion in 2015 was attributable to non-intervened cases, but clarifying that of that $512 
million in recovery that was attributable to non-intervened cases, $472 million was due 
to a settlement with DaVita). While many have characterized what happened in 2015 as 
an anomaly, 2017 saw another spike in success of qui tam relators when the DOJ has 
not intervened with a total recovery of $425 million of the $3.7 billion total recovery. See 
FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43. 
 62 See Topor, supra note 60. 
 63 See United States v. Krizek, 859 F. Supp. 5, 8–12 (1994) (finding liability 
under the FCA for a psychiatrist who submitted bills for services that far exceeded the 
amount of time that the psychiatrist spent providing the services); The OIG also issued 
two Special Fraud Alerts in 1995 and 1996 in response to behavior noted over the past 
decade of providers billing for services never rendered or for greater services than were 
actually rendered. See, e.g., Publication of OIG Special Fraud Alert: Home Health Fraud, 
Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Medical Supplies to Nursing Facilities, 60 Fed. Reg. 
40847, 40848 (Aug. 10, 1995) (providing examples of home health visits that were never 
made, visits to beneficiaries who are not in fact homebound, visits to beneficiaries not 
requiring a qualifying service, and visits not authorized by a physician); Publication of 
OIG Special Fraud Alert: Fraud and Abuse in the Provision of Services in Nursing 
Homes, 61 Fed. Reg. 30, 623–24 (June 17, 1996) (providing an example in a Special Fraud 
Alert about a physician who billed $350,000 for examinations of nursing home residents, 
even though he never physically saw a single resident). 
 64 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Gambro Healthcare Agrees to 
Pay Over $350 Million to Resolve Civil & Criminal Allegations in Medicare Fraud Case 
(Dec. 2, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2004/December/04_civ_774.htm 
[https://perma.cc/UFZ6-UWYB]. 
 65 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 66 See Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 697 (2d Cir. 2001), abrogated by 
Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989 (2016). 
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related to compliance with an underlying statute, law, or 
regulation.67 This was first recognized as a viable claim in the 
case of Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States. In Ab-Tech, 
the alleged false claim was that an executive certified compliance 
with the eligibility requirements under the then-current version 
of the Small Business Act,68 but the company was not in 
compliance with certain aspects of such law.69 
As the viability of this type of claim began to take hold in 
various courts, it also made its way into the health care context, 
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
providing the most comprehensive analysis of this issue—in the 
case of Mikes v. Straus.70 The Mikes court ultimately concluded 
that the allegations—the relator alleged that her former 
physician partners were violating the FCA because of their 
failure to properly calibrate a piece of medical equipment in 
accordance with industry guidelines—did not constitute a 
violation of the FCA.71 The court nevertheless recognized that 
violations of the FCA could encompass not only claims that make 
misrepresentations about the facts of a particular claim, but 
misrepresentations about legal compliance related to the 
rendering of services in connection with a claim, otherwise 
known as an implied false certification.72 
In recognizing this as a viable claim, however, the Mikes 
court was quick to identify its hesitancy about permitting this 
rule to be too expansive in the health care context: 
The Ab-Tech rationale, for example, does not fit comfortably into the 
health care context because the False Claims Act was not designed as 
a blunt instrument to enforce compliance with all medical 
regulations—but rather only those regulations that are a precondition 
 
 67 Id. at 699. 
 68 15 U.S.C. §§ 631–697c (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). 
 69 See Ab-Tech Constr., Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 434 (Fed. Cl. 
1994), aff ’d, 57 F.3d 1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The payment vouchers represented an 
implied certification by Ab-Tech of its continuing adherence to the requirements for 
participation in the 8(a) program. Therefore, by deliberately withholding from SBA 
knowledge of the prohibited contract arrangement with Pyramid, Ab-Tech not only 
dishonored the terms of its agreement with that agency but, more importantly, caused 
the Government to pay out funds in the mistaken belief that it was furthering the aims 
of the 8(a) program. In short, the Government was duped by Ab-Tech’s active 
concealment of a fact vital to the integrity of that program. The withholding of such 
information—information critical to the decision to pay—is the essence of a false claim.”). 
 70 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 696–702. 
 71 Id. at 699. 
 72 Id. (“An implied false certification claim is based on the notion that the act 
of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with governing federal 
rules that are a precondition to payment.”). 
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to payment—and to construe impliedly false certification theory in an 
expansive fashion would improperly broaden the Act’s reach.73 
Thus, in an attempt to limit the application of this theory 
of liability, the court noted that for a plaintiff to sustain an 
implied false certification claim, the plaintiff must show that the 
underlying statute, rule, or regulation is a condition of 
payment.74 Moreover, the court specified that its requirement 
that the underlying regulation be a condition of payment was 
distinct from a requirement of materiality, which was a 
requirement that many courts already imposed on claims arising 
under the FCA.75 The court did not determine how to apply the 
materiality requirement or if it should be implied, rather, it 
stated: “We rule simply that not all instances of regulatory 
noncompliance will cause a claim to become false. We need not 
and do not address whether the Act contains a separate 
materiality requirement.”76 
 
 73 Id. The court went on to also state that health care and regulation of the 
provision of health services has typically been a matter of local law and thus should not 
necessarily be enforced on a wide-spread basis by the federal government. Id. at 700. 
 74 Id. at 697. The court noted that it was following the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, 
and District of Columbia Circuits in its position regarding condition of payment; 
however, it is not clear that those circuits have necessarily maintained that position. Id. 
The District of Columbia Circuit later reversed its position regarding implied false 
certifications. See United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
Further, the Supreme Court in its opinion in Escobar cited to the District of Columbia 
as holding in the case of United States v. Science Applications Int’l Corp. that “conditions 
of payment need not be expressly designated as such to be a basis for False Claims Act 
liability.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1999 (citing United States v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., 
626 F.3d 1257, 1269 (D.C. Cir 2010)). Likewise, while the Mikes court mentions the Fifth 
Circuit for supporting the theory of implied certification based on violations of conditions 
of payment and the Seventh Circuit case in United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd. for 
seemingly rejecting the theory of implied false certification, the Fifth Circuit has not 
really asserted a specific position that aligns with either circuit. See United States v. 
Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015); Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697; see 
also United States ex rel. Steury v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 625 F.3d 262, 268 (5th Cir. 
2010) (“The implied-certification theory of liability under the FCA ‘is based on the notion 
that the act of submitting a claim for reimbursement itself implies compliance with 
governing federal rules that are a precondition to payment.’ This Court has not yet 
recognized the implied-certification theory. . . . We need not resolve the issue today, 
because in any event the factual allegations in Steury’s amended complaint provide no 
basis for implying a false certification.” (quoting Mikes, 274 F.3d at 699)). 
 75 See, e.g., Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 176 F.3d 776, 785 
(4th Cir. 1999) (“Liability under each of the provisions of the False Claims Act is subject 
to the further, judicially-imposed, requirement that the false statement or claim be 
material. Materiality depends on ‘whether the false statement has a natural tendency to 
influence agency action or is capable of influencing agency action.’” (footnote omitted) 
(quoting United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 
1459 (4th Cir. 1997))). 
 76 Mikes, 274 F.3d at 697. 
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2. Circuit Splits Abound 
As more and more cases alleging FCA violations related 
to underlying laws, rules, or regulations made their way through 
various courts, the courts have developed differing approaches 
to the theory of implied false certification. Several circuit courts 
agreed with the Mikes court, finding that an implied false 
certification claim must be based on noncompliance with a 
condition of payment.77 Contrary to the position of the Mikes 
court, however, the First Circuit in United States ex rel. 
Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc. abandoned the Mikes 
court’s categories and labels on the basis that such terms were 
not supported by the actual text of the FCA and might narrow 
the FCA in unintended ways.78 The Blackstone Medical court 
further held that FCA already imposes limitations in the form of 
the materiality requirement and the scienter requirement.79 In 
addition to the First Circuit, the District of Columbia Circuit 
reversed one of its earlier opinions, adopting the more liberal 
standard first articulated in Ab-Tech and later adopted by the 
First Circuit, that implied false certification claims are subject 
to existing scienter and materiality requirements.80 Finally, it 
should be noted that at least one circuit formerly rejected the 
theory of implied false certification entirely. The Seventh 
Circuit took the position that it was declining to join other 
circuits recognizing an implied false certification theory on the 
basis that it seemed unreasonable that an institution—in this 
case, an educational institution under Department of Education 
regulations—would be required on an ongoing basis to comply 
with thousands of pages of federal statutes and regulations for 
the purpose of assessing liability under the FCA.81 
In the midst of this circuit split, the question of the 
viability of an implied false certification claim and how one 
would analyze it under the FCA was further complicated when 
Congress enacted amendments to the FCA in 2009 under the 
Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA).82 Section 
3729(b)(4) resolved a separate circuit split regarding the proper 
 
 77 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 
295, 309-10 (3d Cir. 2011); United States ex. rel. Chesbrough v. VPA, P.C., 655 F.3d 461, 
468 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 78 United States ex rel. Hutcheson v. Blackstone Medical, Inc., 647 F.3d 377, 
387–88 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 79 Id. at 388. 
 80 United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 421, 426 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
 81 United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 696, 711–12 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 82 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617 
(codified as amended in various sections in Titles 18 and 31 of the United States Code). 
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definition of materiality under the FCA by adopting a formal 
statutory definition that reads: “having a natural tendency to 
influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property.”83 The DOJ and courts have treated such 
definition as a relatively low bar for materiality.84 Although two 
circuits had adopted the position that the plaintiff must prove 
materiality in order to sustain an implied false certification 
claim, the changes to FERA did not necessarily affect or impact 
the ongoing circuit split regarding the viability or application of 
implied false certification claims.85 This was due to the fact that 
it was not obvious after the change to “materiality” under FERA 
whether the new definition actually applied to implied false 
certification claims.86 Specifically, the word “material” does not 
actually appear in Section 3729(a)(1)(A), which is the statute 
under which implied false certification claims are typically 
brought.87 Rather, the word “material” appears in Section 
3729(a)(1)(B), addressing fraud by a party causing another party 
to submit a claim88 and Section 3729(a)(1)(G), addressing so-
called reverse false claims in which a party knowingly retains 
money to which it was not entitled.89 Thus, for those courts that 
 
 83 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012). FERA was enacted primarily for the purposes 
of addressing perceived accountability lapses that led to the economic collapse of 2008, 
but included in its provisions “important clarifications to current criminal and civil fraud 
statutes to ensure that law enforcement has the tools it needs to prevent and punish 
these frauds, as well as to recover taxpayer money lost to these frauds.” S. Rep. No. 111-
10, at 1–2 (2009) https://www.congress.gov/111/crpt/srpt10/CRPT-111srpt10.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z23Z-T9WW]. Prior to enactment of FERA, there was no definition of 
“material” under the statute and thus there was a split among the circuits about what 
“material” meant for purposes of claims under the FCA. Under FERA, Congress 
ultimately adopted the definition utilized by the Seventh Circuit in United States v. 
Rogan. United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kungys v. 
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)) (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 
(1999)). This was contrary to some other circuits that proposed a stricter “outcome 
materiality” definition; that is, “a falsehood or misrepresentation must affect the 
government’s ultimate decision whether to remit funds to the claimant in order to be 
‘material.’” United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 676 (5th Cir. 2002), reh’g 
en banc granted by United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 307 F.3d 352 (5th Cir. 2002). 
 84 See Joan H. Krause, Holes in the Triple Canopy: What the Fourth Circuit 
Got Wrong, 68 S. C. L. REV. 845, 851 (2017) (“While FERA’s ‘natural tendency’ test did 
not specifically address the debate, many courts nonetheless interpreted the legislation 
as adopting the lower ‘claim materiality’ threshold.”). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 850–51. 
 87 Id. 
 88 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes 
to be made or used, a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim”). 
 89 Id. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and 
improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government”). A good example of a “reverse false claim” that might be actionable under 
Section 3729(a)(1)(G) is when a hospital becomes aware that it has violated the 
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had adopted the position that implied false certification claims 
should simply be limited by the existing materiality standard, 
the new statutory definition provided some further confusion 
about whether such standard would thus apply to implied false 
certification claims.90 
II. THE ESCOBAR OPINION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
A. The Escobar Opinion 
It was with this backdrop that the case of Universal 
Health Services v. United States ex rel. Escobar made its way to 
the Supreme Court.91 Amid confusion about whether the theory 
of implied false certification was even valid, and, if so, how one 
assesses whether liability should attach to the underlying law, 
statute, or regulation on which the claim is premised, the 
Supreme Court opted to review and decide a case involving an 
analysis of state Medicaid regulations.92 Escobar involved 
allegations against a Massachusetts mental health clinic owned 
and operated by Universal Health Services that had treated a 
teen-aged girl, a Massachusetts Medicaid beneficiary, for mental 
health issues over the period of five years.93 After seeing several 
different providers at the clinic, the girl, Yarushka Rivera, was 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and was later prescribed 
treatment medication by an individual at the clinic claiming to 
be a doctor.94 Unfortunately, Ms. Rivera had an adverse reaction 
to the medication, causing seizures and her eventual death.95 
After Rivera’s death, the family was notified that only one of the 
 
Antikickback Statute. Under applicable regulations, the provider has sixty days from 
the date of discovery to remit any monies paid to the hospital pursuant to an illegal 
referral. See 42 C.F.R. § 401.305 (2017). To the extent the hospital does not remit the 
payments, retaining such monies is thus considered a false claim under Section 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 90 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002 (“We need not decide whether § 3729(a)(1)(A)’s 
materiality requirement is governed § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law.”). 
 91 Id. at 1989. Simultaneous to Escobar, there were three other cases that had 
also petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari regarding the theory of implied false 
certification. See United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 784 F.3d 1198 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (holding that defendant could be liable under the FCA because noncompliance 
with Title IV is material); United States ex rel. Nelson v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 788 F.3d 
696 (7th Cir. 2015) (holding that the implied false certification theory is not valid under 
the FCA); United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 775 F.3d 628 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(holding that the government pleads an implied false certification claim when it alleges 
facts that a request for payment is made and the requestor has knowingly withheld 
information about its noncompliance with material contractual requirements in 
submission of such claim). 
 92 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996–97. 
 93 Id. at 1997. 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id. 
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five providers who saw Rivera was actually properly licensed in 
accordance with Massachusetts law and that the nurse who had 
prescribed the medication did so without authority.96 In all, 
twenty-three of the employees of the mental health clinic did not 
have appropriate licenses and lacked appropriate qualifications, 
all of which was in violation of applicable regulations under the 
state’s Medicaid program.97 
Following a complaint by Rivera’s family, the state 
Medicaid agency issued a report identifying over twelve 
violations of state Medicaid regulations, and Universal Health 
Services subsequently agreed to a remedial plan.98 The family 
then filed a lawsuit alleging that Universal Health Services’ 
violation of Massachusetts Medicaid regulations was an implied 
false certification and thus a violation of the FCA.99 The district 
court in the case dismissed the claim on the basis that while the 
implied false certification theory was valid, the underlying 
regulations were not conditions of payment.100 The First Circuit 
reversed, however, finding that submission of a bill is an implicit 
communication that it is conforming to all relevant rules and the 
regulations were clearly material “because they identified 
adequate supervision as an ‘express and absolute’ condition of 
payment and ‘repeated[ly] reference[d]’ supervision.”101 In 
granting the petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court thus 
defined the purpose of its review to determine the scope and 
validity of the implied false certification theory of liability.102 
In Escobar, the Court established two major holdings. 
First, in response to the validity of the implied false certification 
theory, the Court acknowledged the viability of the theory, but 
noted that such viability was not absolute.103 Relying on a back-
to-basics approach, the Court stated that absent a specific 
 
 96 Id. The Court noted that “the practitioner who prescribed medication to 
Yarushka, and who was held out as a psychiatrist, was in fact a nurse who lacked 
authority to prescribe medications absent supervision” and further observed that the 
person who diagnosed Rivera with bipolar disorder represented herself as a psychologist 
with a PhD, but she had obtained her degree from an online unaccredited institution and 
had been rejected for licensure in the state. Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 1997–98. State Medicaid regulations require clinics such as the one at 
which Rivera was treated to have certain types of providers on staff based on their 
licensure classification and also require certain supervision of other staff members. 
Universal Health Services was not following these rules, but was nevertheless billing for 
services rendered to patients as if such rules were being followed. Id. at 1998. 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal 
Health Servs., Inc., 780 F.3d 504, 514 (1st Cir. 2015)). 
 102 Id. at 1998–99. 
 103 Id. at 1999. 
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definition in the statute of what might constitute “fraud,” courts 
should look to those meanings established under common law 
fraud claims, which have always included “misrepresentations 
by omission” if such claims are materially misleading.104 Thus, 
in order to distinguish between the types of claims that might be 
actionable as fraud and the types of claims that would not, the 
Court established the following two-part test: “first, the claim 
does not merely request payment, but also makes specific 
representations about the goods or services provided; and second, 
the defendant’s failure . . . makes those misrepresentations 
misleading half-truths.”105 
In the second major holding, in response to the scope of 
the implied false certification theory, the Court rejected the 
position of the majority of circuits in holding that such claims 
could only be maintained to the extent that the underlying law 
or regulation was expressly designated as a condition of 
payment.106 Rather, the Court stated, there is no statutory basis 
for limiting claims only to violations of express conditions of 
payment and that appropriate limitations already exist to 
ensure that not every violation of any underlying statute, 
regulation, or contractual provision would somehow trigger FCA 
liability.107 The Court gave the following example in connection 
with the limitation of scienter: “If the Government failed to specify 
that guns it orders must actually shoot, but the defendant knows 
that the Government routinely rescinds contracts if the guns do not 
shoot, the defendant has ‘actual knowledge.’”108 Therefore, the 
federal government should not necessarily be required to label a 
particular rule or regulation as an express condition of payment in 
order to signal to contractors what rules or regulations may be 
material. Such information can be gleaned based on a showing of 
the government’s past actions or communications and the 
defendant’s knowledge of such communications. 
Indeed, the Court reiterated this position when it provided 
guidance regarding what might constitute materiality.109 Although 
the FCA contains a definition of “material” in the statute,110 the  
 104 Id. 
 105 Id. at 2001. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. The Court went on to specify that scienter was an additional limitation 
when it stated, “Likewise, because a reasonable person would realize the imperative of 
a functioning firearm, a defendant’s failure to appreciate the materiality of that 
condition would amount to ‘deliberate ignorance’ or ‘reckless disregard’ of the ‘truth or 
falsity of the information’ even if the Government did not spell this out.” Id. at 2001–02. 
 109 Id. at 2002–04. 
 110 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012) (defining material as “having a natural tendency 
to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property.”). 
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Court did not specifically answer the question as to whether 
such definition was applicable under the implied false 
certification theory.111 Rather, it stated, “We need not decide 
whether the § 3729(a)(1)(A) materiality requirement is governed 
by § 3729(b)(4) or derived directly from the common law.”112 
Instead, the Court looked to the common law understanding of 
materiality to conclude that to determine if something is material, 
one “look[s] to the effect on the likely or actual behavior of the 
recipient of the actual misrepresentation.”113 
Using such definition, the Court provided three examples 
of what might prove whether a claim is or is not material under 
an FCA claim.114 The examples are all based on what the 
government has communicated is material and what the 
defendant knows about the government’s past payment actions. 
First, the Court stated that to prove materiality one might show 
that “the defendant knows that the Government consistently 
refuses to pay claims in the mine run of cases based on 
noncompliance with the particular statutory, regulatory or 
contractual requirement.”115 Second and alternatively, for a 
defendant to show that a claim is not material, one might show 
that “the Government pays a particular claim in full despite its 
actual knowledge that certain requirements were violated.”116 
Third, a defendant could also show a clam is not material if it 
shows that “the Government regularly pays a particular type of 
claim in full despite actual knowledge that certain requirements 
were violated, and has signaled no change in position.”117 Thus, 
while an underlying statute or regulation being an express condition 
of payment may be evidence of materiality, it is not dispositive.118 
The Court also refused to adopt the government’s more 
expansive view of materiality. That is, a violation of a statute, 
regulation, or contractual provision is material if the defendant 
knows that the government could withhold payment if it became 
aware of such violation.119 In rejecting this more expansive view 
of materiality, the Court specifically mentioned an example that 
 
 111 Implied false certification claims are typically brought under Section 
3729(a)(1)(A), which provision under the FCA does not contain the word “material” 
within its language. Id. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
 112 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002. 
 113 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 26 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 69:12 
(4th ed. 2003)). 
 114 Id. at 2003. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. at 2003. 
 117 Id. at 2003–04. 
 118 Id. at 2003. 
 119 Id. at 2004. 
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had come up in oral argument—the American-made stapler.120 
The Court noted that it did not think that the FCA was intended 
to extend liability to a situation in which a regulation requires 
contractors to purchase American-made staplers, but a 
contractor subsequently fails to disclose use of foreign stapler.121 
These examples and similar limitations are littered throughout the 
opinion: the FCA is “not an all-purpose antifraud statute;”122 the 
materiality standard set forth in the case is “demanding;”123 and the 
FCA is intended to capture fraud and not medical malpractice.124 
Thus, a few things are clear from the opinion. First, based 
on principles of common law fraud, FCA liability can include 
fraud that is related to a material misrepresentation of a 
misleading half-truth, which further includes express 
misrepresentations and also omissions (i.e., implied false 
certifications).125 Second, when contemplating what types of 
implied false certification claims should be actionable, claims 
should not be limited to those premised on an express condition 
of payment, but rather should extend to any misleading half-
truth that is material to the government as part of the contract—
like guns that do not shoot.126 Third, materiality should be a 
demanding standard based on the effect on the government’s 
behavior (likely or actual) of the alleged misrepresentation.127 
Accordingly, the government’s knowledge that a contractor used 
a foreign-made stapler in violation of a regulation would not 
result in FCA liability.128 
Like many Supreme Court opinions, the Escobar opinion 
answered a few questions and raised a few more. Now, nearly 
two years removed from Escobar, the lower courts are grappling 
with how to apply the guidelines. While some aspects of the 
opinion appear to be easily applied across jurisdictions, there are 
a number of other areas that are causing a great deal of 
confusion and variability in terms of application of the new 
materiality standard. 
 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 2003 (quoting Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 553 
U.S. 662, 672 (2008)). 
 123 Id. at 1994. 
 124 Id. at 2004. 
 125 Id. at 2001. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 2002. 
 128 Id. at 2004. 
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B. Reaction of the Department of Justice 
Following a Supreme Court opinion, one of the biggest 
drivers of how the case is interpreted is the DOJ’s position in 
subsequent cases and briefs regarding how such opinion should 
be viewed by lower courts.129 It could be said that the DOJ was 
both a winner and a loser in the Escobar opinion. Perhaps the 
most successful aspect of Escobar from the DOJ’s perspective is 
the fact that the case does extend liability under the FCA to 
implied false certification cases and goes so far as to include 
underlying rules or regulations that could be conditions of 
payment or conditions of participation.130 In contrast, however, 
the Court rejected a broad materiality standard and instead 
stressed that the materiality standard should be demanding and 
should protect against reading Escobar as significantly 
expanding liability under the FCA.131 Consequently, Escobar 
seems to be the new favorite defense for entities accused of 
violations of the FCA.132 The DOJ, on the other hand, seems to 
be focused on trying to convince courts that Escobar actually 
changes very little in terms of FCA precedent and that the 
opinion simply reiterated how lower courts were always 
interpreting implied false certification claims.133 Indeed, one 
case noted in its opinion, “[t]he United States argues that 
‘nothing in Escobar purports to overrule preexisting cases like 
Wilkins that affirmed a broader view of implied certification 
than the Supreme Court needed to address in Escobar.’”134 
1. “Specific Misrepresentations” 
There are two primary aspects of the Escobar opinion 
that the DOJ has focused on in its briefs and in arguments to 
the court. First, in an effort to keep the ability to bring implied 
false certification claims as expansive as possible, the DOJ has 
taken the position that the two-part test articulated by the 
Supreme Court for what may be necessary to show when 
alleging an implied false certification is simply one way to plead 
 
 129 Douglas W. Baruch & Jennifer M. Wollenberg, FCA Implied Certification 
Cases—Justice Department’s Aggressive Post-Escobar Briefing Signals Its Concern Over 
the Decision’s Potential Impact, 58 GOV’T CONTRACTOR ¶ 375 (2016). 
 130 See Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001–04. 
 131 See id.; see also Krause, supra note 84, at 851. 
 132 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129. 
 133 Id. 
 134 United States ex rel. Schimpelpfenig v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, Ltd., Civil 
Action No. 11-4607, 2017 WL 1133956, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017). 
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an implied false certification claim.135 Specifically, the DOJ has 
seized onto the introductory phrase in the two-part test: “[W]e 
hold that the implied certification theory can be a basis for 
liability, at least where two conditions are satisfied.”136 In an 
effort to retain the ability to bring an implied false certification 
claim that does not necessarily involve a claim making a 
“specific representation,” the DOJ has been arguing in some 
cases that the requirements set forth in Escobar are not 
exclusive.137 By way of example, the DOJ has argued in certain 
pleadings: “Although Escobar affirmed the implied false 
certification theory in situations where the defendant provides 
some description of the goods or services that render the claim 
misleading, the Court did not suggest that this is the only 
circumstance when the implied false certification theory 
applies.”138 At this point, most courts seem to be applying both 
conditions set forth in Escobar, either without discussion of the 
phrase “at least” or, instead, rejecting altogether the argument 
that Escobar provides merely one circumstance for proving an 
implied false certification claim.139 The DOJ position has been  
 135 The government has been most successful making this argument in 
California because of an existing case, United States ex rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, in which 
the Ninth Circuit held that it is not necessary for the plaintiff to provide an express 
representation in order to sustain an implied false certification claim. United States ex 
rel. Ebeid v. Lungwitz, 616 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, after Escobar, the DOJ 
and relators’ counsel have all been arguing that the two-part test articulated in Escobar 
does not overrule Ebeid, but rather specifies another means by which an implied false 
certification case can be proven. See United States’ Statement of Interest Regarding 
Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar at 5, United States ex rel. 
Mateski v. Raytheon Co., No. 2:CV06-3614ODW(FMOx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016), ECF 
No. 163 [hereinafter United States’ Statement of Interest] (“[T]he United States urges 
the Court to find that the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Ebeid remains good law, and that 
claims for payment by a contractor impliedly certify that the contractor has complied 
with all material terms of its contract.”). 
 136 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001 (emphasis added). 
 137 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129 (citing United States’ Statement of 
Interest, supra note 135, at 1–2). 
 138 Id. 
 139 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir. 
2017) (affirming the grant of summary judgment for the defendant on the basis that 
there was no “specific representation” about Serco’s performance made by its submission 
of public vouchers to the Department of Defense); United States ex rel. Sheet Metal 
Workers Int’l Ass’n v. Horning Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 587, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(applying the test while omitting the “at least in certain circumstance” caveat); United 
States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016) (applying the test as if 
the conditions must be met); United States ex rel. Schimelpfenig, Civil Action No. 11-
4607, 2017 WL 1133956, at *5–6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2017) (holding that despite the 
arguments from the government on this issue, the Third Circuit already adopted 
Escobar’s requirements regarding specific representations in the case of United States 
ex rel. Whatley v. Eastwick College, 657 Fed. App’x 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2016)); but see United 
States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding that 
“specific representation” requirement related to falsity of the claim and that an invoice 
that simply lists the number of guards and hours worked could be considered false 
because of its omissions). 
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successfully adopted by a few district courts,140 however, and the 
specific question as to whether presentation of the two 
conditions are required in each implied false certification theory 
has been certified as a question to the Ninth Circuit.141 
While this appears to be a significant issue for the DOJ 
relative to the FCA generally, it is not entirely clear that it will 
actually be a significant issue in cases involving health care 
companies. Many of the courts that have addressed this issue 
have compared the “specific representations” in Escobar—which 
contains specific codes regarding the types of services that were 
provided and corresponding regulations about the types of 
licensed providers who were supposed to provide the service—to 
rather vague representations such as invoices or reports.142 
Unlike some situations involving the Department of Defense or 
the Department of Education, which often involve submission of 
reports or submission of simple invoices, health care claims seem 
to automatically involve a “specific representation” based on the 
 
 140 As noted above, the DOJ has been most successful in making this argument 
in California because of existing case law that held that it was not necessary for a claim 
to make specific representations to be actionable under the FCA. See Ebeid, 616 F.3d at 
995; see also supra note 135 and accompanying text. For examples of cases in which this 
has been an issue, see United States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044–45 
(C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2016) (“Celgene argues that Brown cannot proceed on an implied 
certification theory because she cannot satisfy the two conditions mentioned in Escobar. 
Celgene misreads that decision. The Court explicitly declined to ‘resolve whether all 
claims for payment implicitly represent that the billing system is legally entitled to 
payment.’ Nor were the two conditions intended to describe the outer reaches of FCA 
liability: the Court stated that liability could be found ‘at least’ where these conditions 
were satisfied.” (citation omitted) (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. United 
States, 136 S. Ct. 2001 (2016))); United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 
F.3d 1027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 2017); United States v. DynCorp Int’l, LLC, 253 F. Supp. 3d 
89, 99–100 (D.D.C. 2017); United States ex rel. Landis v. Tailwind Sports Co., 234 F. 
Supp. 3d 180 (D.D.C. 2017); but see United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., Case 
No. 2:06-cv-03614-ODW(KSx), 2017 WL 1954942, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2017) 
(“Raytheon argues that Escobar limits the implied false certification theory to instances 
where the claim for payment contains specific representations regarding the goods or 
service rendered, as opposed to merely requesting payment. Mateski and the 
Government respond that Escobar’s holding is not so broad, and that the Supreme Court 
expressly withheld judgment on whether an implied false certification theory of liability 
could encompass claims that simply request payment—thus leaving intact the Ninth 
Circuit’s prior case law on that specific issue. After briefing on this Motion was complete, 
the Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc. which 
applied Escobar to an FCA claim under an implied false certification theory. The Court 
concludes that Escobar, as interpreted by Kelly, requires that the claim contain specific 
representations to be actionable.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 141 Rose v. Stephens Inst., No. 09-CV-05966-PJH, 2016 WL 6393513, at *3 (N.D. 
Cal. Oct. 28, 2016). The district court certified the following question to the Ninth 
Circuit, “whether Escobar’s ‘two conditions’ are necessary conditions for liability.” The 
court also certified three other questions to the Ninth Circuit with this question. As of 
April 13, 2018, the Ninth Circuit has not issued an opinion in this case. 
 142 Badr, 857 F.3d at 178 (noting that representations were invoices); Kelly, 846 
F.3d at 332 (noting that the reports contained no “specific representations” as was the 
case in claims submitted in Escobar). 
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fact that each claim will include information regarding the 
service that was claimed to be rendered and applicable 
regulations typically tied to how the service is rendered.143 Even 
FCA allegations that might stem from the filing of cost reports 
would likely be interpreted to contain a distinct representation 
regarding specific costs that were reported to the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) based on the 
understanding of the regulations regarding what costs are and 
are not reimbursed.144 Thus, while this may be an issue in 
connection with FCA claims involving Department of Defense or 
Department of Education, it seems most health care claims will 
already meet the test set forth in Escobar. Given that, even if a 
majority of courts adopt the position that the two-part test set 
forth in Escobar is not exclusive, it is unlikely to affect the ability 
to bring health care claims because they appear to meet both the 
Escobar test and any other less exacting test that could be 
applied in the courts. 
2. Existing “Materiality” Definition 
The second issue that the DOJ has focused on in 
subsequent briefs and oral arguments relates to how the 
materiality inquiry that the Court articulated in Escobar relates 
to the definition of “material” in the statute and whether the 
directive that the standard be “demanding” changes how a court 
should assess materiality.145 Consistent with its position 
generally on the impact of Escobar on existing FCA enforcement, 
the DOJ is largely taking the position that the opinion does not 
indicate a change to the manner in which courts have been 
assessing materiality; that is, “materiality” under the FCA 
should be assessed based on whether the fraud (or in the case of 
implied false certification, the noncompliance) has a “natural 
tendency to influence” the government in its payment decision.146  
 143 DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., FACT SHEET MEDICARE BILLING: 837P AND FORM CMS-1500, MEDICARE 
LEARNING NETWORK 2 (n.d.), https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/Medicare-
Learning-Network-MLN/MLNProducts/downloads/form_cms-1500_fact_sheet.pdf [http://
perma.cc/K7NS-XBFH] (describing how claims should be coded and the level of detail 
required when submitting a claim for a particular service). 
 144 See generally Cost Reports, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://
www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-and-systems/downloadable-public-use-files/cost-
reports/ [http://perma.cc/JJ99-TQYT]. 
 145 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129. 
 146 See United States ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, L.L.C., 
223 F. Supp. 3d 882, 891 (D. Minn. 2016) (holding that the requirement of materiality 
as defined by Section 3729(b)(4) of the FCA must be met to maintain a claim under 
Section 3729(a)(1)(A) or 3729(a)(1)(B) and the materiality factors set forth in Escobar are 
to be used as a guide). As noted above, the “natural tendency to influence” standard 
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Although the Court in Escobar specifically declined to opine as 
to whether that specific statutory definition of material applied 
to implied false certification cases, the DOJ is taking the position 
that the standard applied in Escobar is not a heightened 
standard beyond the usual standard of a “natural tendency.”147 
Thus, the DOJ argues the Escobar materiality inquiry is simply 
for the purpose of determining whether the omission or 
misrepresentation has the natural tendency to influence. 
While lower courts do universally seem to be embracing 
the assertion set forth in Escobar that the materiality standard 
should be demanding,148 courts have expressed some confusion 
and have taken varied approaches regarding whether Escobar’s 
clarification on how to assess materiality in implied false 
certification cases is a new standard or should be assessed 
somehow in conjunction with an historical standard.149 For 
example, some courts have taken the position that the standard 
set forth in Escobar has little distinction from the “natural 
tendency” standard: 
In analyzing materiality, we noted that a material falsehood was one 
that was capable of influencing the Government’s decision to pay. We 
explained that the standard was a high one intended to keep FCA 
liability from attaching to “noncompliance with any of potentially 
hundreds of legal requirements” in a contract. Applying the standard, 
we found Triple Canopy’s omissions material for two reasons: common 
 
arises out of the definition of “material” under Section 3729(b)(4) of the FCA that was 
enacted as part of FERA, which itself was adopted based on long-standing application of 
that definition under applicable case law. See supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text. 
The definition that was adopted under FERA arose out of case law, as courts for years 
had viewed the materiality standard as one simply being capable or having a natural 
tendency to influence and not requiring a showing that such influence was successful. 
See United States v. Rogan, 517 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Instead [Rogan] argues 
that the omissions were not material. By this he does not mean the usual definition, 
under which a ‘statement is material if it has “a natural tendency to influence, or [is] 
capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 
addressed.”’” (quoting Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999))). 
 147 See Supplemental Brief for the United States at 12, United States ex rel. 
Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 2017) (Nos. 13-2190(L), 13-2191), 
2016 WL 4425869 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not impose a heightened test for 
materiality beyond the ‘natural tendency’ test codified in the False Claims Act.”). 
 148 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech, Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–
91 (3d Cir. 2017) (“The Court described [the Escobar standard] as ‘demanding’ and 
‘rigorous’ and explained that a material misrepresentation is one that goes ‘to the very 
essence of the bargain.’” (quoting United States ex rel Escobar, 139 S. Ct. 1989, 2002–2003, 
2003 n.5 (2016))); see also United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 331 (9th 
Cir. 2017); United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 149 See Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489; Johnson, 223 F. Supp. 3d at 891–92; United 
States v. Celgene Corp., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 1044–45 (C.D. Cal. 2016); see also United 
States ex rel. Worthy v. Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, 2:14-cv-00184-JAW, 2017 
WL 211609, at *26 (D. Me. Jan. 18, 2017); United States ex rel. Thayer v. Planned 
Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc., No. 4:11-cv-00129-JAJ-CFB, 2016 WL 7474797, *5–6 
(S.D. Iowa June 21, 2016). 
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sense and Triple Canopy’s own actions in covering up the 
noncompliance. That conclusion perfectly aligns with [Escobar].150 
Some other courts have analyzed materiality under both the 
definitional standard and independently under the Escobar 
standard. In the case of United States ex rel. Petratos v. 
Genentech, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit identified that the FCA defines materiality as “having a 
natural tendency to influence” and described the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Escobar as providing “guidance as to how the 
materiality requirement should be enforced.”151 The court goes 
on to seemingly analyze the “guidance” potentially as its own 
test—separate and apart from the statutory definition—to state 
that the “Supreme Court’s guidance . . . also militates against a 
finding of materiality.”152 Many courts seem to be taking an 
approach similar to that of the Third Circuit, viewing the 
standard set forth in Escobar as the factors necessary for the 
purpose of meeting the statutory definition under the FCA.153 
Two observations arise in connection with this particular 
issue. First, the Escobar Court’s decision not to address the 
relationship between the statutory definition of “material” found 
in Section 3729(b)(4) and the guidance it set forth regarding how 
to assess materiality has caused confusion among the lower 
courts about how to square these two standards. Despite the 
Court’s clear choice not to utilize the statutory definition in 
Escobar, many courts seem compelled by either precedent or 
statutory interpretation to utilize the definition as part of any 
analysis.154 It would seem then, that the DOJ is realizing some 
success as it relates to its argument that Escobar has not really 
altered the broadly-applied natural tendency standard. It does 
appear, however, that while courts may be applying the 
statutory definition, they are simultaneously endorsing the idea 
that Escobar firmly establishes that the materiality standard for 
FCA cases is intended to be demanding and rigorous.155 
Consequently, when courts continue to utilize the statutory 
definition, the manner in which such courts are considering 
whether an omission or misrepresentation has a natural 
tendency to influence or is capable of influencing the decision 
maker is analyzed through a more rigorous and exacting lens. 
 
 150 Badr, 857 F.3d at 178 (quoting United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, 
775 F.3d 628, 637 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated and remanded by 136 S. Ct. 2504 (2016)). 
 151 Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489. 
 152 Id. at 490 (emphasis added). 
 153 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 154 See supra notes 149–152. 
 155 See supra note 140. 
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III. FINDING PROOF OF MATERIALITY 
Predictably, one of the most closely watched aspects of 
the Escobar opinion is how lower court cases interpret the 
guidelines for materiality and the type of proof that may be 
necessary (or is not sufficient) to meet this demanding standard. 
While the Court has instructed that selling the government guns 
that do not shoot despite no express regulation indicating such 
would be material and using foreign-made staplers 
notwithstanding a law requiring use of American-made staplers 
would not be material, the opinion itself does not provide 
examples for what might fall in between these two extremes.156 
In this middle area lies the Court’s direction regarding 
regulations that are expressly conditions of payment. The Court 
made clear that a regulation that is expressly a condition of 
payment is relevant to materiality, although not dispositive.157 
In order to reconcile the previously common analysis regarding 
whether a regulation was a condition of payment with the new 
position under Escobar,158 some lower courts have dedicated a 
great deal of analysis to whether a regulation is an express 
condition of payment and how that conclusion might affect the 
materiality analysis.159 While lower courts have continued to 
analyze whether a regulation is an express condition of payment, 
how courts have utilized their conclusion on this issue for 
purposes of assessing materiality has varied, with some using it 
as evidence of materiality and others utilizing it to hold that 
Escobar made clear this finding alone does not establish 
materiality.160 Although this seems to have made it more difficult 
to determine prior to the filing of any FCA claim whether a 
particular regulation is or is not material, the outcome certainly 
seems to be in furtherance of the Supreme Court’s intention that 
lower courts look more at whether the fraud is the type that 
would rise to the level of common law fraud. 
 
 156 Universal Health Servs, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 
1989, 2001–04 (2016). 
 157 Id. at 2001. 
 158 Many of the cases analyzing the Escobar opinion have done so on a remand 
from a higher court because the lower court holding was based on a finding that the 
implied certification theory did or did not apply based on the fact that the regulation was 
or was not an express condition of payment. See, e.g., Badr, 857 F.3d at 177–78; United 
States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educ., Inc., 840 F.3d 494, 503–04 (8th Cir. 2016). 
 159 Miller, 840 F.3d at 504. 
 160 See Badr, 857 F.3d at 177–78; cf. United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech, 
Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–90 (3d Cir. 2017). 
2018] GUNS THAT DO NOT SHOOT & FOREIGN STAPLERS 1257 
A. Treatment of Conditions of Payment 
In United States v. Triple Canopy, Inc.—a case that the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded 
back to the lower court on the same day that the Supreme Court 
released its Escobar opinion—the specific regulation upon which 
the claim was premised was not an express condition of 
payment.161 Based on Escobar, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed its 
previous conclusion that, absent an express condition of 
payment, materiality could be proven based on “common sense” 
and Triple Canopy’s own actions to conceal any 
noncompliance.162 In support of its assertion that its previous 
holding was consistent with the materiality standard in 
Escobar, the court stated that “Guns that do not shoot are as 
material to the Government’s decision to pay as guards that 
cannot shoot straight.”163 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held in 
United States ex rel. Miller v. Weston Educational, Inc. that 
although falsifying grade records and attendance records was 
not expressly a condition of payment, the misrepresentation was 
clearly material because recordkeeping itself was a 
precondition—in three different ways—for participation in the 
government program and thus payment under the program.164 
In contrast, the Third Circuit analyzed a regulation that 
was expressly a condition of payment, but relied on Escobar’s 
holding that such finding was not dispositive to find that the 
plaintiff failed to plead that CMS consistently refused to pay the 
type of claims set forth in the complaint.165 Rather, the plaintiff 
conceded that such claims were consistently reimbursed.166 The 
plaintiff had argued that whether a claim is material should not 
focus on the government’s decision to pay, but instead should 
look to whether the false statements were material to those 
submitting the claims—the providers in this instance.167 In 
support of this position, the plaintiff cited to the following line 
in Escobar: “materiality ‘look[s] to the effect on the likely or 
actual behavior of the recipient of the alleged misrepresentation.’”168 
 
 161 Badr, 857 F.3d at 179. 
 162 Id. at 178. 
 163 Id. at 179. 
 164 Miller, 840 F.3d at 504. 
 165 Petratos, 855 F.3d at 485. 
 166 Id. at 485–86 (involving claims against a pharmaceutical company that it 
was causing providers to make claims for the drug Avastin that were not “reasonable 
and necessary”). 
 167 Id. at 490–91. 
 168 Id. at 491 (alteration in original) (quoting Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2002 (2016)). 
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The court specifically rejected this idea, however, stating that 
such reference in the context of the Escobar opinion was 
referring to fraud against the federal government (not fraud 
against a third party who then bills the federal government), 
which the Third Circuit claimed was most consistent with other 
holdings.169 Similar to the Third Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also 
analyzed a regulation that was determined to be a condition of 
payment.170 Despite this finding, the court nevertheless 
dismissed the claim on the basis that, among other things, the 
government’s behavior in the past reflected the fact that it did 
not view the allegedly falsified reports as helpful or necessary 
for purposes of payment.171 In both instances, the court found 
that the fact that the regulation was an express condition of 
payment was irrelevant due to the evidence presented that the 
federal government had consistently paid similar types of claims 
in the past despite awareness of fraudulent activity.172 
As the cases above demonstrate, while conditions of 
payment and how such finding affects materiality remains a 
common issue, it seems that the thrust of the Escobar opinion—
and thus the primary emphasis with lower courts—is the newly 
established focus on the government’s behavior and the 
defendant’s knowledge of such behavior.173 Moreover, these cases 
seem to also indicate a shift away from the statutory “natural 
tendency” standard, which would only require proof that the 
misrepresentation would have a tendency to affect the 
government’s decision to pay, toward a materiality standard 
that requires evidence that the government was in fact 
influenced—it knew of the noncompliance and chose to pay the 
claim regardless.174 
Because the Supreme Court provided guidance regarding 
both what might be necessary to substantiate materiality and 
what might negate materiality, some courts have used evidence 
to prove a claim is material and some have used evidence to 
prove a claim is not material. For example, in Abbott v. BP 
Exploration & Production, Inc., the Fifth Circuit dismissed the 
FCA claim on the basis that the government was aware of BP 
Exploration & Production, Inc.’s actions and chose not to 
 
 169 Id. at 491–92 (citing United States ex rel. Garzione v. PAE Gov’t Servs., Inc., 
670 Fed. App’x 126, 127 (4th Cir. 2016)); see United States v. Sanford-Brown, Ltd., 840 
F.3d 445, 447 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 170 See United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 332 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 171 See id. at 334. 
 172 See generally Kelly, 846 F.3d 325; Petratos, 855 F.3d 481. 
 173 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03. 
 174 See, e.g., Kelly, 846 F.3d at 334. 
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suspend operations or to revoke the contract. This government 
inaction thus showed that the government did not find BP 
Exploration & Production, Inc.’s noncompliance material.175 
Quoting Escobar’s directive that “courts need not opine in the 
abstract when the record offers insight into the Government’s 
actual payment decisions,” the District of Columbia Circuit has 
found similarly that a claim did not establish materiality 
because it was not clear that the government actually used the 
alleged fraudulent data for purposes of payment.176 Likewise, an 
allegation of a regulation as a condition precedent to payment 
was insufficient for proving materiality absent additional 
evidence that the government found this material through its 
payment actions.177 In contrast, evidence used to show 
materiality—as opposed to a showing that a regulation was not 
material—has included language in the regulations and 
testimony from regulators themselves about whether or not such 
regulations are material to the government’s payment decision178 
or a lack of knowledge on the part of the government during the 
time that claims were paid.179 
B. The Impact of “Timing” 
While the Supreme Court in Escobar provided guidelines 
about types of evidence that would prove materiality, it provided 
little information regarding when such behavior might occur, 
 
 175 Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 2017). The case 
involved allegations that BP had inadequate documentation and further documentation 
that was not appropriately approved by engineers in connection with the building of an 
oil production platform. U.S. Congress conducted an investigation into the matter, as did 
the Department of Interior. The Department of Interior concluded in a report in 2011 
that the allegations were without merit. Id. at 386. 
 176 United States ex rel. McBride v. Halliburton Co., 848 F.3d 1027, 1032 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017) (citing Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002). 
 177 See United States ex rel. Scharff v. Camelot Counseling, No. 13-cv-3791 (PKC), 
2016 WL 5416494, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff had failed to 
plead materiality in connection with alleged violations of mental health regulations due to 
failure to keep adequate notes, incorrectly billing time spent with patients, and 
maintenance of records that contained patient signatures). 
 178 See United States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 
2016) (“Finally, Plaintiff provides the declaration of the Medicaid Director of the District 
of Columbia Medicaid Program that states that DHCF does not, in fact, reimburse 
providers for services provided where there is no plan of care, where the plan of care has 
not been signed by a physician or advanced practice nurse, where the plan of care has 
been signed but only after services had been rendered, or where a signed plan of care 
exists but the services billed exceed the scope of that plan.”). 
 179 See United States ex rel. Escobar v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 842 F.3d 
103, 111–12 (1st Cir. 2016) (holding on remand that the claims were material even 
though there was evidence that the government continued to pay the claims because it 
was during a time of a lack of government knowledge). 
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either before or after the fraud has been alleged.180 For example, 
in Triple Canopy, Inc., in addition to the Fourth Circuit’s finding 
that materiality was simply “common sense,” the court found 
that the defendant’s own behavior substantiated materiality.181 
Specifically, the court found that the defendant’s attempt to 
conceal that many of its guards did not possess the necessary 
certification as marksman pursuant to the contract was clearly 
representative of the fact that the defendants knew that the 
government would not pay the claims if it knew the guards did 
not have such qualifications.182 In other words, the defendant 
would never have felt compelled to make the fraudulent 
representations unless the defendant suspected that the 
government would not pay the claims if it knew.183 The court also 
cited to the government’s behavior as evidence, noting that when 
the government became aware that it was possible that Triple 
Canopy’s guards did not meet necessary qualifications, the 
federal government did not renew the contract with the company 
and also immediately intervened in the FCA case after the 
whistleblower filed the claim.184 In this case, the court used 
prospective knowledge of the defendant and retrospective 
behavior of the government to show materiality. 
A similar example of when a court looked to the 
retrospective behavior of the government for purposes of proving 
materiality is the First Circuit’s analysis on remand of the 
Escobar case.185 Universal Health Services argued that the state 
Medicaid program was aware of the company’s violations 
because the plaintiffs, prior to filing the FCA case, had actually 
filed a complaint with the state Medicaid program and the 
Medicaid program continued to pay claims despite being made 
aware of the allegations by the family.186 The First Circuit 
rejected this reasoning, however, on the basis that “mere 
awareness of allegations concerning noncompliance with 
 
 180 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179 
(4th Cir. 2017) (utilizing the fact that the DOJ intervened on the FCA case after it was 
filed as proof of materiality); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Serco, Inc., 846 F.3d 325, 337 
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that although the federal government had noted a particular 
recordkeeping requirement as a condition of payment prior to the filing, this was 
nevertheless not dispositive of a finding of materiality because the government did not 
rely on the reports for purpose of payment); Escobar, 842 F.3d at 112 (holding that 
although the state of New York was arguably aware of the fraud after investigation of the 
provider following a complaint, the fact that the state continued to pay the claim despite 
this knowledge was not determinative of a finding that the claims were not material). 
 181 Badr, 857 F.3d at 176–78. 
 182 Id. at 176. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. at 179. 
 185 See Escobar, 842 F.3d at 105. 
 186 Id. at 111–12. 
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regulations is different from knowledge of actual 
noncompliance” and there was no evidence of actual knowledge 
by the government such that it would negate a finding of 
materiality.187 The court does not opine as to whether its finding 
of materiality would be negated if the government continued to 
pay the claims despite actual knowledge, but the opinion does 
seem to suggest that to the extent that one intends to prove a 
claim is not material, actual knowledge of noncompliance would 
be a necessary prerequisite.188 
Most of the cases analyzing materiality based on the 
government’s knowledge of the noncompliance have relied on 
evidence regarding the government’s knowledge and action or 
inaction prior to the filing of the FCA claim, and few at this point 
have identified the scheme itself as indicative of materiality.189 
Thus, while it appears that most courts are examining past 
behavior, the possibility that evidence of behavior retrospective 
to the filing of an FCA claim or, indeed the alleged fraud itself, 
does have the potential for confusion and challenges. Distinct 
from an express condition of payment, which would have put a 
government contractor on notice as to whether violation of such 
regulation would be subject to liability under the FCA, the new 
materiality standard requires a case-by-case analysis as to the 
government’s knowledge of each action and the defendant’s 
awareness of the government’s knowledge. While the 
materiality standard might more closely resemble claims 
asserting common law fraud, it provides potentially less clarity 
to contractors regarding the types of behavior that may or may 
not be actionable under the FCA and what interactions with 
government regulators might mean for future FCA liability. 
 
 187 Id. at 112 (“[T]here is no evidence in the complaint that MassHealth, the 
entity paying Medicaid claims, had actual knowledge of any of these allegations (much 
less their veracity) as it paid UCH’s claims.”). 
 188 Id. (“Because we find no evidence that MassHealth had actual knowledge of 
the violations at the time it paid the claims at issue, we need not decide whether actual 
knowledge of the violations would in fact be sufficiently strong evidence that the 
violations were not material to the government’s payment decision so as to support a 
motion to dismiss in this case.”). 
 189 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 492 
(3d Cir. 2017); United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc., 862 F.3d 890, 905–06 
(9th Cir. 2017) (holding that, while the FDA was at least aware of the noncompliance 
because of a warning letter and an inspection and noncompliance letter and the 
government continued to pay claims, FDA’s failure to withdraw approval of the drug 
does not suffice to provide the claims were material for purposes of FCA); A1 
Procurement, LLC v. Thermcor, Inc., No. 2:15cv15, 2017 WL 2881350, at *6 (E.D. Va. 
July 5, 2017). But see Badr, 857 F.3d at 178. 
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IV. ARGUMENT: THE IMPACT OF ESCOBAR ON HEALTH CARE 
COMPANIES 
As courts of appeals and district courts wade through 
allegations against contractors with the Department of Defense, 
Department of Education, and Department of Health and 
Human Services under the FCA,190 the Escobar opinion has 
provided helpful guidance by affirming the validity of implied 
false certification claims and by emphasizing that the materiality 
standard under the FCA is demanding and rigorous and thus 
should be applied strictly.191 Like many Supreme Court opinions, 
however, it has also raised a number of questions and issues, 
resulting in inconsistent application of different aspects of implied 
false certification claims. The DOJ seems to be doing its best to 
argue that Escobar has changed little to nothing about the legal 
analysis for implied false certification claims.192 While this has 
had at least some success,193 it does seem that most courts view 
Escobar not simply as affirmation to permit implied false 
certification claims, but a directive to apply a stricter and more 
precise application of implied false certification claims.194 As 
such, most courts appear to be at least considering Escobar to 
require analyzing regulations and materiality with a different lens. 
It should be noted, however, that while many courts 
appear to be giving credence to this more demanding standard, 
it is not entirely clear whether these same cases would have 
come out differently had Escobar instead adopted the position of 
the majority of circuits permitting implied false certification 
claims to proceed only in connection with regulations expressly 
designated as conditions of payment. While a few courts have in 
fact permitted claims to proceed that are seemingly based on 
 
 190 See Justice Dep’t Recovers Over $3.7 Billion, supra note 7 (noting that FCA 
recoveries arise out of the health care industry, but also from “defense and national 
security, food safety and inspection, federally insured loans and mortgages, highway funds, 
small business contracts, agricultural subsidies, disaster assistance, and import tariffs”). 
 191 See, e.g., Petratos, 855 F.3d at 489; A1 Procurement, LLC, 2017 WL 2881350 
at *3; United States ex rel. Lee v. N. Adult Daily Health Care Ctr., 205 F. Supp. 3d 276, 
295 (E.D.N.Y. 2016); United States ex rel. Brown v. Celgene Co., 226 F. Supp. 3d 1032, 
1049 (C.D. Cal. 2016). 
 192 Baruch & Wollenberg, supra note 129. 
 193 See discussion supra note 140. 
 194 In perhaps one of the most notable examples of this application to date, a 
district judge in Florida negated a $350 million judgment against a nursing home operator 
for alleged violations of the FCA on the basis that “[t]he defendants argue persuasively that 
the relator failed to offer evidence of materiality, defined unambiguously and required 
emphatically by Universal Health Services, Inc. v. Escobar.” See Jeff Overley, Escobar 
Erases Nursing Co.’s $350M FCA Verdict, LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2018, 6:27 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1001439 [https://perma.cc/38RG-NYPN]. 
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violations of conditions of participation,195 the large bulk of FCA 
claims that actually proceed to court—in lieu of settlement—are 
typically dismissed on a motion for summary judgment.196 
Further, in the bulk of these cases, the government has reviewed 
the case and chosen not to intervene, and thus the relator is 
proceeding on his/her own.197 While intervention in a case should 
not be used in all instances as a marker for the viability of the 
case itself, there are many cases in which the government 
declines to intervene or proceed to settlement because the claim 
does not have sufficient merit to be successfully argued in 
court.198 Thus, given that the vast majority of the examples of the 
application of Escobar are in cases making their way through 
the court system—and thus have been unsealed due to the 
government’s declination to intervene—it is challenging to 
understand and fully comprehend the impact that Escobar and 
the new materiality standard actually has on FCA claims. The 
bulk of legal analysis and interpretation of Escobar has thus far 
and will continue to arise out of claims that may have been 
flawed or legally unsustainable for entirely other reasons. Given 
that, it is somewhat dubious or dangerous to claim that Escobar 
has entirely changed the legal landscape such that the new 
exacting standard is dismissing vastly more claims than would be 
dismissed prior to Escobar. Courts seem to be aware that Escobar 
stands for the notion that implied false certification claims must 
 
 195 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Johnson v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care, 
L.L.C., 223 F. Supp. 3d 882, 894 (D. Minn. 2016). 
 196 In a review of cases from the federal courts of appeals in the twelve months 
following the Escobar opinion that cited to Escobar in some manner in their opinion, 
there were only six cases of the thirty-two that did not affirm the district court opinion 
and, of those twenty-nine cases, nearly all affirmed the dismissal of the FCA claim in the 
district court. Note that while the vast majority of these cases were FCA cases, at least 
a few were related to another law, but utilized Escobar for purposes of analyzing 
materiality. See, e.g., In re Vivendi, S.A. Securities Litigation, 838 F.3d 223 (2d. Cir. 
2016) (citing to Escobar to support the legal premise that “half-truths . . . can be 
actionable misrepresentations” (quoting Universal Health Servs. v. United States ex rel 
Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 2000 & n.3 (2016))). Many of the cases involved dismissal of 
the claim for failure to plead with particularity or failure to state a claim and were not 
actually dismissed based on either failure to please a specific representation in an 
implied false certification claim or meet the new materiality standard. See, e.g., United 
States ex rel. McGrath v. Microsemi Corp., 690 Fed. App’x 551, 552 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(affirmed dismissal under Rules 8(a) and 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); 
Olson v. Fairview Health Servs. of Minnesota, 831 F.3d 1063, 1066 (8th Cir. 2016) 
(affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); United 
States & Wisconsin ex rel. Presser v. Acacia Mental Health Clinic, LLC, 836 F.3d 770, 
772–73 (7th Cir. 2016) (affirmed dismissal of the bulk of claims for failure to state a claim 
under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 197 See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43, at 1. 
 198 David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: 
Empirical Analysis of DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam Litigation under the False Claims Act, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 1689, 1693–94 (2013). 
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be viewed rigorously, but this does not appear to be the sole or 
singular reason that courts are dismissing FCA claims.199 
It is possible that there could be some clarity on this 
front, given the DOJ’s current position regarding how 
department prosecutors should address FCA claims in which the 
DOJ has chosen not to intervene.200 In an internal memorandum 
dated January 10, 2018, Director Michael D. Granston noted to 
attorneys in the Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section 
that while the number of qui tam cases has increased greatly 
over the last few years, the DOJ’s intervention rate has 
“remained relatively static.”201 Because the government still 
expends a substantial amount of money to monitor and 
participate in non-intervened cases, Director Granston 
instructed prosecutors to consider whether to seek a dismissal of 
claims that the prosecutors believe lack substantial merit.202 
While Granston stated that dismissal should be used “only 
where truly warranted,” the memorandum is a directive to 
prosecutors to be more proactive regarding not just declining to 
intervene in meritless cases, but actively working towards 
curbing meritless claims.203 Thus, while this directive will not 
eliminate all non-intervened cases, there should be perhaps 
fewer meritless claims applying the Escobar analysis. This may 
in turn provide a more accurate assessment of how stringently 
Escobar will be applied to meritorious claims. 
A. Assessing Common Law Fraud 
Regardless of whether the reason certain cases are 
dismissed is standards set forth in Escobar or because of other 
pleading or evidentiary challenges, there is nevertheless a great 
body of precedent that is building regarding the impact of Escobar 
on implied false certification claims. Beyond the umbrella themes 
related to a rigorous and demanding standard, the Supreme 
Court seems to be attempting to steer FCA application, which 
 
 199 See, e.g., D’Agostino v. EV3, Inc., 845 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming 
dismissal based on plaintiff being barred by the public disclosure bar); Hagerty ex rel. 
United States v. Cyberonics, Inc., 844 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 2016) (affirming dismissal based 
on failure to plead with particularity); United States ex rel. Whatley v. Eastwick College, 
657 Fed. App’x 89 (3d Cir. 2016). 
 200 Internal Memorandum from Michael Granston, Director of United State 
Dep’t of Justice, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section, Factors for Evaluating 
Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A), Internal Memorandum, (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.fcadefenselawblog.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/561/2018/01/Memo-for-
Evaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31-U-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/5SYG-SB4V]. 
 201 Id. at 1. 
 202 Id. 
 203 Id. at 2–3. 
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has ballooned into what can be described as “big business” for 
the federal government,204 towards a back-to-basics application 
akin to common law fraud. As is the case of common law fraud, 
the Court’s new analysis advises lower courts that there is no 
strict definition of “fraud,” rather the court must look at whether 
a particular admission or omission of certain details was a 
misrepresentation made for the purpose of misleading or 
defrauding.205 The Court’s examples bear this out: contractors 
that are selling the government guns, but such guns do not 
actually shoot, are perpetuating a fraud and contractors that are 
selling the government guns, but are using foreign-made 
staplers to staple their invoices as opposed to American-made 
staplers, even if in violation of a federal regulation, are not 
perpetuating a fraud.206 Thus, the Court is telling relators, 
prosecutors, and courts alike that they should stop focusing on 
the regulation and the characteristics of the regulation and 
instead focus on the act itself and whether such act is intended 
to defraud. 
There is no doubt that Escobar has changed the manner 
in which implied false certification claims are pleaded and the 
type of evidence that parties are putting forth in order for the 
claims to be successful—or at least to survive the summary 
judgment stage. Certainly, the prosecutors’ bar and relators’ bar 
are closely monitoring lower court cases analyzing Escobar for 
purposes of litigation strategy and careful pleading. 
In addition to their watchful eyes, however, there are a 
whole host of health care transactional attorneys, compliance 
officers, medical coding professionals, and health care 
regulatory experts trying to also determine how Escobar is 
changing the legal landscape. Specifically, those entities most 
commonly subject to the FCA, particularly health care providers 
and suppliers, are paying considerably close attention for 
purposes of assessing compliance risk and managing legal 
liability.207 With thousands of statutes and regulations—both 
federal and state—governing the services and operations of 
 
 204 See supra notes 7, 39–40 and accompanying text. 
 205 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (defining 
common law fraud as “[o]ne who fraudulently makes a misrepresentation of fact, opinion, 
intention or law for the purpose of inducing another to act or to refrain from action in 
reliance upon it, is subject to liability to the other in deceit for pecuniary loss caused to 
him by his justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation”). 
 206 See Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. 
Ct. 1989, 2001–04 (2016). 
 207 See generally Paul F. Khoury et al., Government Contractors Deal with the 
Uncertain Shadow of Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Escobar, 52 
PROCUREMENT LAW. 12 (2017). 
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health care providers and suppliers, such entities might submit 
hundreds of claims per day all impliedly certifying compliance 
with any number of statutes, rules, and regulations to which 
such provider or supplier is subject.208 
Based on the Escobar opinion, at least some of these 
underlying statutes, rules, and regulations (collectively, the 
“regulations”) are clearly material enough that noncompliance 
with such regulations could result in FCA liability.209 It is 
equally clear, however, that some of these regulations are more 
for purposes of dictating how care should be delivered or certain 
operations should take place, but are not entirely material to the 
government’s payment decision. Trying to now decipher the 
distinction between those regulations based on the guidance 
from Escobar and the opinions analyzing Escobar, all with 
unique facts and unique regulations, may be the biggest 
challenge yet to be faced. 
One argument consistently averred by defendants prior 
to the opinion in Escobar was that to the extent that implied 
false certification claims are viable, liability must be limited to 
express false certification claims in order to provide defendants 
with “fair notice” regarding what might be fraudulent under the 
FCA.210 In response to Universal Health Service’s use of this 
argument in Escobar, the Court stated: 
Universal Health’s approach [of limiting implied false certification 
claims to regulations that are expressly designated conditions of 
payment] risks undercutting [the FCA’s] policy goals. The 
Government might respond by designating every legal requirement 
 
 208 Entities that participate in the Medicare program (both providers and 
suppliers) are subject to federal Medicare statutes, rules, and regulations as participants. 
See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., MEDICARE ENROLLMENT APPLICATION (CMS-
855A) 48 (Expires Aug. 2019), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/CMS-Forms/CMS-Forms/
Downloads/cms855a.pdf [http://perma.cc/46CE-ATNE] (“I agree to abide by the Medicare 
laws, regulations and program instructions that apply to this provider. The Medicare 
laws, regulations and program instructions are available through the Medicare 
contractor. I understand that payment of a claim by Medicare is conditioned upon the 
claim and the underlying transaction complying with such laws, regulations, and 
program instructions . . ., and on the provider’s compliance with all application conditions 
of participation in Medicare.”). Entities may also choose—separately—to participate in 
state Medicaid programs. Because the Medicaid program is a program that is jointly 
operated and funded by the states and the federal government, there are both federal 
statues, rules, and regulations that govern Medicaid providers and also state statutes, 
rules, and regulations that govern Medicaid providers operating in a particular state. 
See generally Federal Policy Guidance, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medicaid.gov/
federal-policy-guidance/federal-policy-guidance.html [http://perma.cc/CVN8-MY5Z]; see 
also, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-102 (2017) et seq.; TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-13-
01 (2016) et seq.; see also Financing & Reimbursement, MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.
medicaid.gov/medicaid/financing-and-reimbursement/ [https://perma.cc/235B-JZ8H] (“The 
Medicaid program is jointly funded by the federal government and states.”). 
 209 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1996, 2002–04. 
 210 Id. at 2002. 
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an express condition of payment. But billing parties are often subject 
to thousands of complex statutory and regulatory provisions. Facing 
False Claims Act liability for violating any of them would hardly help 
would-be defendants anticipate and prioritize compliance obligations. 
And forcing the Government to expressly designate a provision as a 
condition of payment would create further arbitrariness. Under 
Universal Health’s view, misrepresenting compliance with a 
requirement that the Government expressly identified as a condition 
of payment could expose a defendant to liability. Yet, under this theory, 
misrepresenting compliance with a condition of eligibility to even 
participate in a federal program when submitting a claim would not.211 
It is certainly a valid point that to the extent that implied false 
certification claims were limited to express conditions of 
payment that one reaction from the government could be simply 
to identify all claims as conditions of payment.212 It seems 
unlikely, however, that CMS would revise the myriad 
regulations to designate all regulations as conditions of payment 
merely to create liability under the FCA. This is especially true 
if the government is truly only interested in litigating FCA 
claims that are material to the government’s decision to pay the 
claim and there is a genuine interest in preventing parasitic 
lawsuits under the FCA. Further, to the extent that all 
regulations were reclassified or amended to be expressly 
designated as conditions of payment, there would be no need for 
a materiality standard or a scienter requirement at all under an 
FCA claim. 
To the extent that all regulations were expressly 
designated as conditions of payment, then essentially all such 
regulations would be considered automatically material and all 
defendants would have the necessary scienter because they 
would be on notice that all regulations are expressly designated 
as condition of payment. Thus, two of the most basic, necessary 
FCA pleading requirements—excluding other general pleading 
requirements such as particularity or failure to state a claim or 
other procedural challenges such as the public disclosure 
bar213—would be met without any requirement that the plaintiffs 
have to actually prove such requirements.214 Given the efforts 
 
 211 Id. 
 212 Id. 
 213 See generally Joel D. Hesch, Restating the “Original Source Exception” to the 
False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. RICH. 
L. REV. 991 (2017); Aaron Rubin, To Present Bills or Not to Present? An In-Depth Analysis 
of the Burden of Pleading in Qui Tam Suits, 8 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 467 (2012). 
 214 The Court in Escobar discussed the relationship between the requirements 
of materiality and scienter in connection with a FCA claim. The Court stated, “A 
defendant can have ‘actual knowledge’ that a condition is material without the 
Government expressly calling it a condition of payment.” Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2001. 
“What matters is not the label the Government attaches to a requirement, but whether 
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over the years to ensure the proper balance between capturing 
fraud against the federal government and protecting against 
parasitic lawsuits, it seems an unlikely result that Congress or 
administrative agencies would adopt a position that would make 
all regulations preconditions to payment or effectively eliminate 
the need to affirmatively prove materiality and scienter. 
B. Escobar’s Effect on Compliance and Risk Management 
The question remains, then, even if it may be unlikely 
that the federal government would actually have adopted the 
tact of expressly designating each regulation as a condition of 
payment, how will the Court’s rejection of a bright-line rule 
under Escobar affect compliance and risk management? Will 
contractors be able to adequately assess risk and prioritize 
compliance based on the guidance and dictates of Escobar? 
Because the health care industry represents the entity with the 
largest FCA remittance to the federal government,215 this 
industry seems an appropriate example for purposes of 
exploring the potential compliance impact of the Escobar 
opinion. With the thousands of regulations that apply to health 
care providers and suppliers, compliance programs and 
prospective efforts to reduce legal liability—primarily related to 
billing and collection—have become a fairly substantial part of 
the operation of health care entities.216 Indeed, each year, the 
Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and 
Human Services releases work plans that provide information 
 
the defendant knowingly violated a requirement that the defendant knows is material 
to the Government’s payment decision.” Id. at 1996. To the extent that the Court had 
adopted a position that implied false certification claims were required to be conditions 
of payment, this would meet both materiality and scienter requirements. 
 215 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
 216 The Office of Inspector General has a webpage dedicated to compliance 
titled, “Compliance 101” in which it advises providers and suppliers about “health care 
fraud and abuse laws and the consequences of violating them.” Compliance Education 
Materials: Compliance 101, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/101/ 
[http://perma.cc/VX7B-HZP7]. Compliance and the need for compliance programs has its 
roots in the 1990s and stems largely from language in the U.S. Sentencing Commission’s 
promulgation of Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, which would reduce 
sanctions against a corporation if such corporation adopted “an effective program to 
prevent and detect violations of law.” Thomas E. Bartrum & L. Edward Bryant, Jr., The 
Brave New World of Health Care Compliance Programs, 6 ANNALS HEALTH L. 51, 55 
(1997) (quoting UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (1995)). 
The requirement for an effective compliance program was tested in the settlement 
proposal to the Delaware Supreme Court in which the court approved a settlement 
proposal because the court found that that Board of Directors for Caremark 
International, Inc. was not aware that the company had been violating certain provisions 
of a federal antibribery law and once the board discovered such issue, it exercised 
reasonable oversight in accordance with its existing and effective compliance program. 
See In re Caremark Intern., Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
2018] GUNS THAT DO NOT SHOOT & FOREIGN STAPLERS 1269 
and guidance to various types of providers and suppliers for the 
sole purpose of informing such industries about the 
government’s concerns regarding legal compliance priorities for 
that particular industry.217 
With the myriad regulations governing operations and 
the exceedingly varied operations of health care entities,218 the 
simple reality is that it is exceptionally difficult for providers 
and suppliers to be in constant and complete compliance with all 
health care regulations at all times. This can be seen from the 
Office of Inspector General (OIG) Work Plan and compliance 
guidance itself; at any given time, for any given sector of health 
care, there are a number of different concerns that the OIG cites 
to regarding what its area of compliance focus is for that 
particular time period.219 Thus, compliance offices must assess 
all of the various risk factors identified and then not only correct 
the noncompliance and address the processes going forward, but 
also prioritize the order in which such action steps will occur. 
For example, to the extent that a compliance officer uncovers 
four to five risk areas during a routine internal audit—or worse 
yet during an audit by a Medicare contractor or the OIG—the 
compliance officer must determine which of the risk areas 
should be addressed first and the manner in which the issues 
will be addressed.220 
 
 217 See Work Plan, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/
reports-and-publications/workplan/ [http://perma.cc/2QLP-5MAK]. “The Office of Inspector 
General’s (OIG) work planning process is dynamic and adjustments are made 
throughout the year to meet priorities and anticipate and respond to emerging issues 
with the resources available. . . . The OIG Work Plan sets forth various projects 
including OIG audits and evaluations that are underway or planned to be addressed 
during the fiscal year and beyond by OIG’s Office of Audit Services and Office of 
Evaluation and Inspectors.” Id. 
 218 A large hospital or health system might operate an inpatient hospital, 
outpatient clinics, post-acute services, ancillary services (such as imaging services), or 
other physician services and would be responsible for billing and compliance for each 
of these types of services that are all governed by unique and distinct rules and 
regulations. Even if owned by (and all services billed by) a single legal entity, each 
type of entity is subject to separate Medicare regulations and applicable state 
regulations. For example, a hospital operating in the state of Tennessee alone would 
be required to comply with applicable state law. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-11-
1601 et seq. (2017) (establishing a health care facility); id. § 68-11-201 et seq.; TENN. 
COMP. R. & REGS. 1200-08-01. The hospital would also have to comply with applicable 
federal law. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 485.50 et seq. (2017) (governing conditions of 
participation for hospitals). As such health system may increase services, additional 
laws and regulations become applicable. 
 219 The most recent Work Plan, updated in July 17, 2017, lists six different topics 
in its “What’s New” area. See Work Plan, supra note 217; see also Compliance Guidance, 
U.S DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://oig.hhs.gov/compliance/compliance-guidance/
index.asp [http://perma.cc/2FBS-23BG] (providing links to compliance program guidance 
for nursing homes, researchers, hospitals, ambulance suppliers, etc.). 
 220 See Bartrum & Bryant, supra note 216, at 60–61 (“Few facilities, however, 
have the resources necessary to adopt an all-inclusive compliance program in one fell 
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Typically, compliance offices can prioritize risk based on 
the level of legal exposure for the risk areas. For instance, 
discovery of errors in billing processes that have resulted in 
higher reimbursement than is warranted or discovery that a 
number of leases with referring physicians have expired would 
result not only in immediate action both to correct the errors on 
a go-forward basis, but also likely assessment of whether any 
amounts need to be remitted to the government for 
overpayments.221 Thus, what may or may not be actionable 
under the FCA is of vital importance to a compliance office or 
officer when assessing risk and trying to prioritize how to and in 
what manner to assess such risk. 
While the result in Escobar may be a better assessment 
of the kind of fraud that the government is actually concerned 
about preventing under the FCA, which may ultimately lead to 
less arbitrary application of the FCA, it is nevertheless a larger 
challenge for the purpose of utilizing the opinion as guidance on 
whether a particular instance of noncompliance is or is not 
actionable under the FCA. Based on the Escobar guidance, it 
seems that a contracting entity must, at all times, assess the 
entity’s own knowledge about the government’s position on 
regulations whether or not the government has communicated 
in some manner (thus putting the entity “on notice”) about if a 
particular regulation is material to the government’s decision to 
pay. Likewise, the entity must monitor the government for 
communication, both personal to the company as demonstrated 
by analysis in Triple Canopy, Inc.222 and on a more general level 
as demonstrated by analysis in Dynamic Visions, Inc.223 
 
swoop. There are just too many laws that impact health care facilities. Accordingly, it is 
necessary to prioritize. For most hospitals, Medicare billing, especially in the area of 
clinical laboratories, is a concern. Accordingly, a compliance program should be 
implemented for this area first.”). 
 221 Once a billing error has been discovered by an entity, retaining any amounts 
that have been paid to the entity in excess of amounts the entity is actually owed are 
considered an overpayment. Under the FCA, it is a violation of the FCA to retain such 
amounts any longer than sixty days from the date such overpayments were discovered. 
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (2012). Similarly, permitting a referring physician to lease 
space without a lease in place—subject to certain exceptions such as certain holdover 
allowances—may be a violation of either or both the Antikickback Statute and the Stark 
Law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(2) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1). 
 222 Communication that is “personal” to the company is specific information 
that may be communicated regarding its particular behavior. In Badr, part of what the 
Fourth Circuit relied on in arriving at its conclusion was that the government had not 
renewed its contract with the defendant company and that the DOJ had intervened in 
the case. These are communications that are specific to Triple Canopy, Inc. itself, not 
general communication about a statute or rule as it might apply across the industry. See 
United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 223 More general communication is communication that the federal 
government, specifically the Department of Health and Human Services through CMS 
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Additionally, the entity must monitor for communication 
both prior to the alleged fraud and potentially also after the 
alleged fraud—such as the cancelling of a contract or decision to 
intervene in the case224—to determine whether the government 
has communicated in some manner regarding its position on 
whether it will reimburse despite certain noncompliance. While 
the federal government (and state governments to some extent) 
publishes guidance and compliance resources, such as the OIG 
Work Plan and Compliance Program Guidance for various 
industries,225 there is no doubt that the government cannot and 
does not address or communicate about each regulation on a 
regular basis. Moreover, it is not entirely clear what sort of 
communication from the government would be sufficient to 
constitute materiality to the extent that such communication 
was not specific as to materiality for purposes of FCA. As can be 
seen from some of the cases mentioned above, there have been 
cases in which the plaintiff did provide evidence of at least some 
government communication, but such communication was not 
sufficient to constitute materiality.226 
The DOJ has subsequently issued an internal 
memorandum, since made public, which perhaps will provide 
some clarity for courts regarding the types of communication on 
which courts can rely for purposes of application of Escobar’s 
materiality test.227 While not specifically tied to FCA cases, the 
memorandum was issued for the purpose of instructing DOJ 
attorneys about the impact of what the memorandum refers to 
as “guidance documents” and their use by the DOJ in connection 
with litigation.228 By way of background, the Attorney General 
had issued an earlier memorandum on November 16, 2017, which 
prohibited departments “from issuing guidance documents that 
effectively bind the public without undergoing the notice-and-
comment rulemaking process.”229 Former Associate Attorney 
 
and OIG, communicates about a particular rule, regulation, or compliance within a 
certain industry. See United States v. Dynamic Visions, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 3d 1, 16 
(D.D.C. 2016) (presenting evidence from the Medicaid director about statements she had 
made regarding the Medicaid department’s position regarding whether a regulation is 
material to payment). 
 224 See Badr, 857 F.3d at 179. 
 225 See Compliance Guidance, supra note 219; Work Plan, supra note 217. 
 226 See, e.g., cases set forth in supra note 180. 
 227 Internal Memorandum from Assoc. Att’y Gen, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Head 
of Civil Litigating Components, U.S. Att’ys, Limited Use of Agency Guidance Documents 
in Affirmative Civil Enforcement Cases (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/
1028756/download [https://perma.cc/TLY7-A6QV]. 
 228 Id. at 1. 
 229 Id. The memorandum defines “guidance documents” as “any agency 
statement of general applicability and future effect, whether styled as ‘guidance’ or 
otherwise, that is designed to advise parties outside the federal Executive Branch about 
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General, Rachel Brand, states in the memorandum that the 
directives set forth in a November 16, 2017, memorandum 
issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions applies to the DOJ 
litigators for purposes of determining the use of guidance 
documents in affirmative civil enforcement (ACE) actions.230 
Specifically, the 2018 memorandum states, “effective immediately 
for ACE cases, the [DOJ] may not use its enforcement authority to 
effectively convert agency guidance documents into binding rules. 
Likewise, [DOJ] litigators may not use noncompliance with 
guidance documents as a basis for violations of applicable law in 
ACE cases.”231 The 2018 memorandum notes that while such 
guidance documents cannot be used as if they were binding law, 
they can be used as evidence to show that a party “had the 
requisite knowledge” of whatever legal mandate as may be 
referenced in the guidance documents.232 The 2018 memorandum 
will have the effect of likely reducing the number of cases that meet 
Escobar standards, on the basis that the guidance documents will 
not be able to be applied in the same ways as if they were a rule or 
law. But, the intended use of the documents is to aid in being 
able to prove knowledge of compliance requirements, and thus, 
knowledge of one’s actions for failure to comply.233 While these 
documents might assist in proof of scienter, they might not help 
in addressing the issues noted above regarding whether such 
communication is sufficiently clear to indicate materiality. 
C. Need for Clarification on Timing 
Similarly, it is not entirely clear as to whether the 
government’s actions can be either general prospective 
communication or retrospective communication based on the 
misrepresentation itself. In United States ex rel. Petratos v. 
Genentech, Inc., the Third Circuit found that although the 
regulation in question was expressly designated as a condition  
legal rights and obligations. This memorandum does not apply to adjudicatory actions 
that do not have aim or effect of bind anyone beyond the parties involved, documents 
informing the public of agency enforcement priorities or factors considered in exercising 
prosecutorial discretion, or internal directives, memoranda, training materials for 
agency personnel.” Id. at n.1. 
 230 Id. (“‘Affirmative civil enforcement’ refers to the Department’s filing of civil 
lawsuits on behalf of the United States to recover government money lost to fraud or 
other misconduct or to impose penalties for violations of Federal health, safety, civil 
rights or environmental laws. For example, this memorandum applies when the 
Department is enforcing the False Claims Act, alleging that a party knowingly submitted 
a false claim for payment by falsely certifying compliance with material statutory or 
regulatory requirements.”). 
 231 Id. at 2. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
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of payment (potentially an example of a prospective 
communication regarding materiality), the plaintiff had failed to 
provide evidence that the misrepresentations were material to 
the government’s payment decision because the plaintiff conceded 
that the government did continue to pay the claims.234 In contrast, 
Abbott v. BP Exploration & Production, Inc. relied on an 
investigation and report conducted by the Department of Interior 
regarding some specific reporting practices in order to prove that 
the government’s lack of punishment or change in practices 
following the issuing of the report was insufficient in showing that 
compliance with the regulations in question was material.235 
Thus, trying to decipher the type of communication that 
will suffice for purposes of proving materiality and at what point 
such communications are rendered to health care contractors for 
purposes of the filing of an FCA action appears easier in a 
courtroom setting—with ample time for the court to consider the 
various issues and consequences before making a determination—
than in the fast-paced and multifaceted setting of the compliance 
office. This is not to say, however, that the Court’s Escobar 
decision should have either completely rejected the possibility of 
implied false certification claims or, alternatively, adopted the 
position that all implied false certification claims must be based 
on regulations that are expressly designated as conditions of 
payment. Certainly, there are cases like that of Yaruska Rivera 
in which the misrepresentations or fraudulent behavior are so 
egregious that it would seem to fly in the face of the entire 
intention behind the FCA to claim that simply because the fraud 
was against the law instead of related to a specific fact that it 
should not be actionable.236 Likewise, consistent with the Court’s 
stated concerns (and what would have also resulted in a 
dismissal in the Escobar case), adopting a bright-line rule that 
limits the applicability of implied false certification claims may 
arbitrarily create liability for certain regulations over the other, 
with no basis in the origins or underpinnings of the FCA. 
 
 234 United States ex rel. Petratos v. Genentech Inc., 855 F.3d 481, 489–90 
(3d Cir. 2017). 
 235 Abbot v. BP Expl. & Prod., Inc., 851 F.3d 384, 387–88 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 236 It should be noted that Escobar misrepresentations could be classified as 
both factual falsities and legal falsities because not only was the clinic in violation of 
application Medicaid regulations because they did not have the appropriate and properly 
licensed staff as required by law, but it also lied about the factual nature of the 
credentials of the individuals working at the clinic. This is characterized as a legal 
falsity, however, because of how the claim was brought under the FCA and the specific 
regulation that the clinic was alleged to have violated. Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. 
United States ex rel. Escobar, 136 S. Ct. 1989, 1997–98 (2016). 
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Thus, this article does not argue that Escobar was 
wrongly decided or that adopting a different position entirely 
would have been a better result. Rather, it argues that 
understanding when a regulation may or may not be material 
under the FCA is extremely important not just for litigants, but 
for health care entities and their compliance offices and that the 
Escobar Court’s guidance does not go far enough in providing 
sufficient details about what liability may lie between guns that 
do not shoot and foreign-made staplers. While lower court cases 
are starting to provide a bit more detail regarding what types of 
noncompliance might look like closer to errant guns and what 
types of noncompliance look more like foreign staplers, it may 
take quite some time for courts to arrive at a consensus position 
on certain regulations or types of regulations. Moreover, to the 
extent that most cases involve situations in which the federal 
government has declined to intervene, the majority of cases are 
dismissed prior to trial and thus it might be easier to determine 
what is not material as opposed to what is material.237 Through 
this process, health care entities are thrust into the position of 
assuming, as least absent very clear evidence to the contrary, 
that noncompliance with most regulations could be material 
under the FCA. Entities can feel some comfort in the fact that 
Escobar seems to impose a stricter standard on claims, but that 
is not helpful for purposes of trying to assess and prioritize risk 
and compliance concerns in real time. 
Given the nature of FCA claims and the time that it takes 
to bring an FCA claim to resolution, this lack of clarity may also 
affect settlements—the primary means by which most FCA 
cases are resolved.238 While Escobar enables potential 
defendants the possibility of arguing against liability, even to 
the extent that the underlying rule or regulation is an express 
condition of payment, the opinion also enables the DOJ to argue 
that nearly any regulation could be sufficiently material for 
purpose of establishing an FCA claim.239 Without sufficient 
clarity regarding materiality and an ability to manage risk, 
entities under investigation might feel greater pressure to 
settle—despite the possibility of imposition of a stricter standard 
in court—because the scope of regulations that are potentially 
material is broader. To the extent that parties feel compelled to 
settle because of a lack of either knowledge or confidence 
 
 237 See FRAUD STATISTICS, supra note 43, at 1. 
 238 See FACT SHEET, supra note 57. 
 239 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 1995 (holding that implied false certification can be a 
basis for liability, but it is not limited to claims based only on conditions of payment, but 
can also include claims based on conditions of participation). 
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regarding what may be actionable under the FCA, the possibility 
of parasitic lawsuits will greatly increase. 
Moreover, to the extent that materiality can be proven 
based on evidence of the government’s communication subsequent 
to the misrepresentations, such as whether or not the government 
intervened in the case as in Triple Canopy, Inc., the communication 
between the parties prior to the unsealing of the case and whether 
a defendant can convince the government to intervene may become 
even more critical.240 To the extent government intervention is 
proof of materiality, then it would seem that all the government 
has to do during settlement negotiations is make clear to the 
defendant its intention to intervene and the defendant will likely 
feel pressure to settle or face the possibility of a long and 
protracted litigation—at least unless there are other grounds for 
dismissal at the pleading stage. 
While parties can simply wait and monitor cases in the 
hopes that enough clarity eventually evolves from the district 
courts and courts of appeals as they analyze Escobar, the more 
expedient solution might be to encourage greater and more 
specific clarity from CMS and other state agencies regarding 
what they really believe to be material. To the extent that this 
communication is precise and directed, this could be helpful for 
providers and suppliers to appropriately manage risk and 
compliance initiatives. If CMS and other state agencies share 
the same opinions about Escobar and how it should impact FCA 
liability as the DOJ, however, it seems unlikely that this clarity 
is coming. The DOJ is trying to convince courts to reject those 
aspects of Escobar that would result in greater scrutiny of 
claims, while at the same time embracing the broader view that 
implied false certification claims encompass both conditions of 
payment and conditions of participation.241 Nevertheless, greater 
communication and clarity regarding materiality remains 
potentially the most expedient and efficient way of providing 
some much needed detail and transparency for compliance offices 
about how to assess what may or may not be actionable under the 
FCA and thus prioritize compliance initiatives and legal risk. 
Absent this communication, materiality under the FCA may be 
clear in the more extreme and egregious instances of 
noncompliance (or alternatively in the most obviously insignificant 
instances of noncompliance) only, but will remain opaque in the 
vast amount of the cases in the middle. 
 
 240 United States ex rel. Badr v. Triple Canopy, Inc., 857 F.3d 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 241 See supra notes 196–99 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS states: “a misrepresentation 
must be material in order that the law may take notice of it as a 
fraud.”242 It is with this backdrop that the Supreme Court tried 
to ensure that application of the FCA was consistent with its 
roots: the statute was established to capture fraud against the 
federal government and that “fraud” is and should be based on 
the common law principles of what courts know and recognize 
fraud to be.243 Further, under such common law principles, the 
legal system is only concerned about fraud that may cause 
another to take action to their detriment that they otherwise 
would not have taken but for the fraud.244 And thus, the Court 
through Escobar is steering lower courts into a back-to-basics 
approach in which they examine not the type of regulation or the 
section of a particular code, rule book, or statute in which the 
regulation happens to be located, but the regulation itself and 
the government’s communication regarding whether that 
regulation is or is not material to its payment decision. Such 
approach does seem most consistent with the origins of the FCA 
and a good way of assuring that courts and prosecutors stay 
focused on fraud or misrepresentations that seem to go to the 
“essence of the bargain.”245 Despite all of this, there are 
significant challenges in the type of approach that the Court has 
adopted in Escobar. 
While it is clear that violation of a law, rule, or regulation 
that is part and parcel of the necessary performance of the 
contract (e.g., if you are selling the government guns, the guns 
should shoot, even if there is not a statute or regulation that 
expressly provides that failure to comply would result in the 
government’s refusal to pay the claim) is material and that a 
violation of a law, rule, or regulation that is largely unrelated to 
the necessary performance of the contract (like whether or not 
the contractor is using American-made office products) is not 
material, it is not entirely clear what precisely stands in the 
middle of these two extremes. While being able to argue this 
point in the context of litigation strategy might be less 
problematic, trying to use the words of Escobar and some of the 
interpretations of the lower courts to determine what the 
compliance risk might be related to a discovery of noncompliance 
 
 242 WILLISTON, supra note 113, at § 69:12. 
 243 Escobar, 136 S. Ct. at 2002–03. 
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is significantly more difficult. Although adoption of a bright line 
may have led to arbitrary results, there does need to be an 
increased emphasis on assisting government contractors, 
especially providers and suppliers who participate in federal 
health care programs, with a more clearly articulated position 
on the types of noncompliance that lie in the mysterious middle 
of “material.” 
Given the types of cases and claims under the FCA that 
are typically reviewed and analyzed by courts, and also the slow 
and rather confusing and meandering method and process of 
developing guidance through case law, it seems necessary to be 
able to assist compliance offices and companies in prioritizing 
and assessing risk. This can be done by providing more detail 
and comment regarding those regulations that CMS and state 
agencies are truly most concerned. Not only will this 
communication be key for ongoing compliance and general 
operations, but it will further guard against dangers that 
contractors will be compelled in almost all instances to settle for 
fear of government intervention and how that might impact 
materiality. Providing this increased communication and 
direction will assist in assuring that the FCA continues for years 
to come and strikes the right balance between capturing fraud 
against the government while protecting innocent actors against 
parasitic lawsuits. 
